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We can avoid these self-defeating pitfalls by regarding rape not as a fact to be
accepted or opposed, tried or avenged, but as a process to be analyzed and
undermined as it occurs. . .Another way to refuse rape as the real fact of our lives is
to treat it as a linguistic fact: to ask how the violence of rape is enabled by
narratives, complexes and institutions which derive their strength not from outright,
immutable, unbeatable force, but rather from their power to structure our lives as
imposing cultural scripts.
Sharon Marcus 1
In “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words,” Sharon Marcus suggests that women view
rape as a script, a cultural-rather than truthful-narrative about women’s submissiveness
and man’s inevitable aggression. Rather than fixing either “identity” and focusing upon the
social/legal consequences of rape, Marcus suggests the metaphor of a script over which
actors have ultimate control. Disrupting the rape script by engaging the rapist as his equal,
then, creates a new script and a new politics of rape no longer hinged to a defacto female
victim. Marcus’ argument centers upon a conflation of “real” and “text.” The political
implications of viewing the “real” as a text that can be re-written are profound. Gendered,
racial power relationships appearing to be “cast in stone” become malleable and
inauthoritative as we disrupt the flow of the narrative and create a new text. This paper
takes a similar instinct to conflate the “real” or natural or fixed with the textual, the
constructed, the changeable. For this paper, however, the conflation is reversed. I will
explore the ways in which the text (or Marcus' “script”) is “real or political and how such
a view of texts might alter our notion of writing and introduce a different location of
politics.
Jacques Derrida’s concept of deconstruction as a method for reading texts will play
an important role in altering the relationship between reader and text and in accessing a
•Marcus, 1993: 388.
textual politics. Deconstruction elicits strong reactions from almost any political position
and from almost every intellectual field. Such widespread rancor speaks not only to the
complexity of deconstruction as an idea, but also to the vast “success” Derrida has had in
jolting the consciousness of both Western European and American intellectual endeavors.
Derrida’s post- Of Grammatology (1974) works have predominantly been acts of
deconstruction. Deconstruction is proposed and defined through Derrida’s engagement
with texts by Austin, Levi-Strauss, and Lacan to name a few. Through these engagements,
the presumptions of linguistic theory, western humanism, and psychoanalysis are
devastated, played with, exposed and interrogated. That Derrida has been called a nihilist
and deconstruction, destruction
,
then, is unsurprising. Nevertheless, as literary critic
Barbara Johnson writes.
Deconstruction is not synonymous with destruction. . .It is in fact much closer to
the original meaning of the word analysis, which etymologically means “to undo”-
a virtual synonym for “to de-construct.” The de-construction of a text does not
proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by careful teasing out of
warring forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in a
deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of
one mode of signifying over another. (1981: 5)
As Johnson describes it, the destruction of unequivocal, dominating modes of signification
would appear to have great potential for a politics of marginalized, oppressed groups. Yet,
Derrida and his method of deconstruction has been met with as great an antipathy from
many feminist theorists and members of the Left, as it has from those whose voices
maintain the unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another. As Chapter
two will argue, deconstruction does not produce a retreat from politics, but has instead
produced a different and textual level of engagement with identity and representation.
Personal legal narratives operate on this textual level.
What is a legal narrative? Legal storytelling is hardly a new convention. From
Biblical to contemporary American times, stories about the law and about justice and
injustice have pervaded western culture. The proliferation of stories about the law is not a
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new or startling cultural event. What is new is the location of these stories within
traditional, conservative, and impersonal law journals and reviews. This location affords
legal storytelling a new critical position. That is, it is not just the authors of these narratives
(often law professors and lawyers) who are attempting something new, the audiences to
whom these narratives are directed are also being asked to read and think in a new way.
Legal theory has predominantly been the site of abstract writing about nameless and
faceless judges and lawyers engaged in, according to whom you believe, either
indeterminate and political or determinate and inherently legal decision making. In both
cases, legal theorists seek a theoretical center for law-something I will call legal myth-
making. Whether upholding or challenging the notion of law as a neutral and apolitical
force, these theories reinforce the existence of a theoretical “center” in which law is
demarcated as “distinct” or specialized knowledge. Even the legal realists’ contributions,
with their rejection of positivism and their interest in who judges were as people, looked to
provable fact and broad statistical and sociological patterns to support their analysis of the
law. Legal fictions as well as autobiographical stories introduce the concept of
unknowable and un-testable knowledge to the legal canon.
This epistemological shift in legal theorizing can be identified with the introduction
of literary scholarship into the law as well as the introduction of women and people of color
whose “stories” differed from the neutral and objective “non-stories” of legal doctrine and
theories. Law professor Derrick Bell is both the originator and the most well-known
employer of the fictional method of legal theorizing. His work has been influential to both
the genre of legal narrative and to the critical race movement which several of his students
founded. His creation and various uses of the strong-willed, super-lawyer and civil rights
activist Geneva Crenshaw as a literary device for challenging civil rights doctrine and the
founding fathers themselves opened the door for other legal scholars to experiment with the
form of legal theory as well as its content. Initially skeptical that such a literary approach
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would be accepted by prominent law reviews and prominent legal scholars. Bell admits.
And to my great relief, the Harvard Law Review editors accepted my unorthodox
approach and contributed their energy, skill, and enthusiasm to the editing process” (1987:
xii). Richard Delgado s Rodrigo Chronicles (1995) followed Bell’s lead by inventing
Geneva Crenshaw’s younger, half-brother Rodrigo-a law student of African and Latino
descent-engaged in conversations (actually, book reviews in the form of a dialogue) with
an older crit law professor.
Bell’s use of fictional narrative and allegory implicitly proposes a distinction
between fiction and non-fiction in legal writing. Like any writer. Bell chooses his genre,
diction, audience, etc. While Bell makes similar arguments in more traditional forms
concerning race and racism in the law, the use of fictional characters and “imaginary”
conversations offer Bell a new expanse in which to explore the meaning of race and legal
reasoning:
In order to appraise the contradictions and inconsistencies that pervade the all too
real world of racial oppression, I have chosen in this book the tools not only of
reason but of unreason, of fantasy. .
.
[F]airy tales in their early versions did not
always have happy endings but, rather, usually reflected, through the folktales on
which many were based, the harsh life of eighteenth-century peasants. . . .The role
and fate of civil rights measures can be compared to those of the brides in the
French fairy tale Bluebeard’s Castle . . .The brides are rebellious rather than
redemptive. . .(1987: 5)
Bell likens his own “metaphorical tales” to these folk tales, mirroring back to the culture the
failures and hopelessness of its own present. Contrary to their Disney-ized reifications.
Bell’s antecedents do not necessarily end happily or even hopefully. Instead, these tales
rely upon the reader to respond to the dilemmas and crises depicted in Bell’s tales. As
Gary Minda suggests, “Bell uses this imaginative narrative much in the way novels are
used in literary studies to evoke awareness about the human condition (1995: 156).
Neither Bell nor Delgado place themselves “literally” in their stories. Instead, they
“strive to make themselves disappear” (1995: xv). Like all fiction writers, the authors
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deflect identification of themselves with their characters arguing that the characters are
composites of people they know in and outside the law. Delgado refers to Rodrigo as
simply “my exuberant alter ego.” While the relationship between author and character is
open to interpretation, the issues within each text are undeniably autobiographical in
essence. Both Bell and Delgado (the authors) are established and successful minority legal
scholars with years of experience both in the traditional academy and in civil rights activism
and critical race scholarship. DuBois theory of “double consciousness,” then
unsurprisingly becomes a topic of conversation for Delgado’s alter ego:
Rodrigo explained. “You’ve heard, I assume, of double consciousness?”
“Of course”. . .
“And you know that many members of minority groups speak two languages, grow
up in two cultures?” .... “And, so,” Rodrigo continued, “who has the advantage
in mastering and applying critical social thought? Who tends to think of everything
in two or more ways at the same time? Who is a postmodernist virtually as a
condition of his or her being?” (1995: 8)
Delgado’s use of a conversation between intellectuals, much like Plato’s dialogues, allows
not only the deflection of his identity from the narrator or any other character (as in the old
argument, is Plato Socrates or is Plato the inventor of Socrates?), but also (and perhaps as
a consequence) a blank canvas upon which to propose, interject, reject, and accept any and
all arguments surrounding race and the law in contemporary times.
The reader of the fictional legal narrative is left not simply to accept or reject the
claims as claims made by the characters, but to interpret these characters as creations of an
external author. Should we accept Geneva Crenshaw as a reliable character? Does the
narrator respect her opinion? Does Bell? Is Rodrigo a naive and over-zealous punk as the
narrator sometimes suggests, or is Rodrigo the prophet and the narrator, the punk? Layers
of textual meaning are created and offered for interpretation by the fictional form. How
these layers of characterization, argument, tone, etc., are analyzed continually places the
theorist/author apart from and a part of the interpretive process. The reader is asked to read
a law review article that is merely a story about the law, and, as a result, can not help but
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apply that allegorical and mythical style of reading to the “truths” he or she may encounter
elsewhere in that law review or in the law itself. Patricia Williams describes the effects of
reading Bell’s Geneva Crenshaw: “[I]t is easy to forget that Geneva Crenshaw is not a
real, objective, third person, but part of the author. She is an extension of Bell, no less
than the doctrines of precedent and of narrow constructionism are extensions of the judges
who employ them. She is an opinion, no less than any judge’s opinion, an invention of
her author; an outgrowth of the text; a phantom” (1991: 199). The opinions encountered in
Bell’s and Delgado’s fictions have a didactic element by virtue of their inclusion in the
highly academic law reviews. The ways these opinions teach, however, rely upon a
different kind of readerly participation.
As Robert A. Williams writes in the foreword to Delgado’s Rodrigo Chronicles,
“An Indian Storyteller is much more interested in the “truth” contained in a story. And a
great storyteller always makes that “truth” in the story fit the needs of the moment” (1995:
xii). Readers are required to search out the meaning or “truths” embedded in these fictional
stories. A similar type of reading is demanded by the authors of the next set of legal
narratives taken as the focus of this paper. If fictional legal narratives like those of Bell and
Delgado are veiled autobiography or, at least, autobiographic^/, are personal legal
narratives unveiled, identical representations of the authors’ or their clients’ lives? The
answer is often yes and no. The “truths” of “non-fictional” personal legal narratives are
much like those of their fictional counterparts. Their force lies in their ability “to fit the
needs of the moment,” rather than their chronological and historical accuracy.
Unlike those legal theorists who attempt to reproduce clients’ or legal outsiders’
experiences in review articles, 2 law professors have incorporated their own experiences as
2See, for instance, Martha Mahoney's “Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation” in Michigan Law Review (Oct. 1991) or Mari Matsuda s Public Response to Racist Speech.
Considering the Victim’s Story,” in Words That Wound (1993).
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legal outsiders into their legal theorizing. Catharine MacKinnon’s Only Words (1993)
advanced a narrative relying to some extent upon her experience creating and attempting to
pass anti-pornography statutes. While this text could not be accused of lacking a cogent
issue or a legal principle as is the case with other personal narratives, MacKinnon’s
autobiographical storytelling mixed with her writing style created a narrative about
women s oppression. MacKinnon herself might be more inclined to argue that she is
telling a truthful and accurate story of women's sexual oppression and abuse.
Nevertheless, this collection of speeches is effective, or at least powerful, because of the
literary devices MacKinnon commands. Derrick Bell has also contributed to this form of
legal theorizing most recently in Confronting Authority: Reflections ofan Ardent Protester
(1994). By placing his own life experience as evidence for how and why to challenge
those in power. Bell contributes to the genre of law professors’ personal narratives about
the law and their attempts to persuade others to join a critique of law.
Marie Ashe’s “Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web” documents her
experiences with the impersonal and often degrading process of giving birth within the
legal mandates of hospitals. Contrasting the circumstances of the births of her five children
and her miscarriages, Ashe espouses the value of homebirthing and midwifery and
reproaches the law for imposing upon women’s reproductive freedom. Like the fiction of
Bell and Delgado, the form of Ashe’s writing demands that law review readers approach
the text in a different way—not scanning for facts, tests, decisions, and implications, but
becoming absorbed in the story Ashe tells:
I want a law that will let us be — women. That, recognizing the violence inherent in
every regulation of female “reproduction,” defines an area of non-regulation, within
which we will make, each of us, our own “mortal decisions.” (1989: 383)
This sentence is as much and as little as Ashe states concerning legal principles and their
relevance to the experiences she spends most of the article discussing. As the quotation
suggests, the political and legal implications of Ashe’s writing are numerous and
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complicated, but Ashe s choice of genre leaves those discussions as products of the
reading, rather than pre-ordained, inherent components of Ashe’s experience. Of course,
such an interpretation is itself open to debate. In addition to these cries for legal theory to
function in and around staid legal principles, personal narratives have been described as
“committed to a politics of identity" (Minda, 1995: 148) [emphasis in original].
As the focus of this paper, the politics of personal legal narratives, particularly
those of Patricia Williams, will be described and read in greater detail in chapter four. To
preface that reading, chapters two and three discuss the importance of deconstruction and
the context of legal theory’s mythical temptations. Both chapters help to frame the writing
and reading of personal legal narratives. While this frame is drawn from literary and legal
theory, this paper does not remain within one disciplinary field, nor does it suggest that one
field might offer the best interpretive perspective. On the contrary, I will try to argue that
personal legal narratives are perched on a fence between competing discourses-avoiding
normative claims about one or another. Legal theory has been influenced by many
disciplines including critical race theory, economics, linguistics, literary criticism, and the
social sciences more generally. For organizational purposes and because of my own
specialized interests, I have arranged this paper around feminist theories about both
deconstruction and the law, an unstable and contested canon of legal theory, and the
personal narratives that have emerged from both. Gleaned from feminist debates about its
political value, deconstruction informs my attempt to read personal legal narratives like that
of Patricia Williams not only as contests over legal ideas, but as contests over meaning,
language, and form within the law-as textual politics.
Following an explanation of deconstruction and the feminist theory it has engaged,
I explore the debates in the field of jurisprudence concerning law, justice, and judicial
discretion. These debates should be seen as continuing and concurrent, rather than as a
linear progression from wrong-headed to right-headed views of law. I have organized
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legal thought according to several temptations-theories that justify or mythologize the
structures of law as distinct; theories that criticize these structures according to other myths
or disciplines; and theories that introduce difference or identity politics into legal structures.
Chapter Four, then, focuses upon the genre of personal narratives in the law. The
interpretation of these texts by the legal academy can be seen as following two interpretive
avenues-demanding either a claim to legal distinct-ness or a representative identity politics.
The division between law and politics—though criticized—continues to define the parameters
of any reading (or interpretation) of personal legal narratives. I argue, however, that
personal legal narratives operate in a space between these two worlds. To offer an
alternative to these overly-determined readings, I attempt locate personal legal narratives as
textual politics. By re-thinking the relationship between reader and text and context,
personal legal narratives can be seen as an attempt to criticize identity politics without
buying into the traditional and overly determined theory of legal distinct-ness. This is what
Patricia Williams attempts when she demands that her narrative be listed in card catalogues
under “race” and “alchemy”—two words that are legally and politically “nowhere.”
Personal legal narratives suggest that what appears to be fence-riding or dodging between
two (or more) discourses or disciplines is actually a vibrant and politically viable location, a





Contemporary feminist theorists are engaged in contradictory and provocative
debates about the relationship between acting politically and theorizing “the political.” Most
feminist theories attempt to coordinate movement politics and theoretical frameworks-both
material and intellectual revolutions. Emerging from the tenuous but fertile margins of both
leftist political activism and canonical political thought, feminist theories, one might argue,
should have a certain affinity for a Derridean notion of deconstruction and its de-centering
of the center and re-conceiving of the Other. Nevertheless, Derrida’s hesitation to address
power relations per se has endured as feminist critique of the deconstructive method.
Perhaps for this reason, feminist theorists have addressed the “politics” of Derrida’s
deconstruction with varying results. Because of the attempt by feminist theories to engage
in politics while defining what is “political,” a review of the debate concerning
deconstruction within feminism is a fruitful way of exploring the use of Derridean thought.
Philosophy professor Nancy Fraser and law professor Drucilla Cornell disagree about the
usefulness of deconstruction for feminist politics and theory. As Fraser poses the skeptical
question: “Does deconstruction have any political implications?” (1989: 69), Cornell
responds by re-naming deconstruction “the philosophy of the limit.” Cornell suggests that
Derrida’s de-centering of dominant discourses produces knowledge of the Other or those
who have been ignored or erased by the center. This, for Cornell, is an ethical move in
Derrida’s theory and one that makes it a valuable tool for women and other castaways. By
addressing this continuing debate between Fraser and Cornell, I hope to expose some of
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the concerns feminist theorists have raised concerning deconstruction and some of the
potential Cornell s philosophy of the limit might hold for discovering a textual politics.
B. Derrida and deconstruction
Derrida s work “radically” problematizes metaphysics, humanism, any coherent
and determined ideas or identities-that is, the philosophical and political foundations of the
West. Deconstruction attempts to pursue the indeterminacy of language, the impossibility
of determining a “transcendental signified.” Derrida interrogates the binary oppositions of
a “logocentric tradition [which] stabilize^] the uncertainties of signification, through a set
of ‘violent hierarchies’ privileging a central term over a marginal one: nature over culture,
male over female, and most importantly, speech over writing” (Baldick, 1990: 52). By
“deconstructing” these hierarchies, Derrida shows not only that the marginalized term is
always at work within the central term (thus dissolving their opposition), but also that any
single meaning for these terms is always already deferred, displaced, and multiplied.
Derrida calls this deferral and multiplication of meanings “differance”--using the two
meanings of this French word (to differ and to defer) and the difference between the way
this word is written and spoken to characterize the inevitable and prolonged undecidability
of language. I will draw out the method of deconstruction as Derrida applies it to language
and interpretation.
Responding to John R. Searle’s response to “Signature, Event, Context,” Derrida’s
“Limited Inc., a b c. . .” deconstructs the speech/writing dichotomy present in Austin’s
How to Do Things With Words and the presence/absence dichotomy at work in Searle’s
reply. An authentic speaker or voice is already absent in language because every speech act
(written or spoken) iterates (repeats and pollutes) previous acts. Derrida explains:
Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in
order that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable in, through, and
even in view of its alteration. For the structure of iteration—and this is another ot its
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decisive traits-implies both identity and difference. Iteration in its “purest” form-
and it is always impure-contains in itself the discrepancy of a difference that
constitutes it as iteration. (1988a, 53)
Derrida collapses identity and difference not in order to destroy their meanings, but rather,
the opposite, to expose them as multiple and continuously altered. In the “context” of
language, an iteration (a word on a page, an idiom, a contract) is both ideally recognizable
and productive of a difference--a remainder ( restance ). In this extensive but crucial
passage, Derrida explains how difference in language produces, rather than destroys
meaning:
It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual “element” as well
as between the “elements,” because it splits each element while constituting it,
because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although
indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is differential structure
escaping the logic of presence or the (simple or dialectical) opposition of presence
and absence, upon which the opposition the idea of permanence depends. . .Like
the trace it is, the mark is neither present nor absent. This is what is remarkable
about it, even if it is not remarked.
. .And, it is not negative, but rather the positive
condition of the emergence of a mark. (1988a, 53)
The remainder propels meaning to the next iteration. Each mark in language is never full or
empty of meaning, never clearly locatable, and always multiplying its identifiability with
difference.
Derrida applies his skepticism concerning a determinant theory of language to a
theory of interpretation. In interpreting literary and political texts, Derrida looks at
margins, at interruptions in coherent readings, and at false oppositions. Following
Foucault’s turn from a question of “who rules” to “how does rule work,” Derrida’s textual
“play” does not ask “who speaks,” but instead, “how does speech work?” Or, more
precisely, how does language work? How does, as Derrida writes, “the signature invent
the signer”? (1986: 10). Derrida argues that texts perform within a theater3 of language
3
I realize that this metaphor of performance and theater is suggestive of (and probably suggested
by) Judith Butler’s (1990) description of gender as a performance within a set of rules. Though
I’m not
prepared to relate BuUer to Derrida here, I do think a metaphor of performance in language works
here.
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which can not be fully known (identified), nor can it be fully escaped (differentiated).
Derrida writes: “[W]e can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not
already had to slip into the form, logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it
seeks to contest” (1988b: 395). In “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida consciously
exposes the way his own text remains inside language. While sign, signifies signified can
not help but connote the system that created them, Derrida can not not use these terms:
The concept of the sign.
. .has lived only on this opposition [between intelligible
and sensible] and its system. But we cannot do without the concept of the sign, for
we cannot give up the metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique
we are directing against this complicity, or without the risk of erasing difference in
the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier outside itself. (1988b, 396)
The critique, then, relies as much upon what it criticizes (as a false center, as a universal
signified) as it does upon its marginalized difference. For Derrida, a critique that “comes
out of nowhere in either space or time” (Honig, 1993: 210) is not only ineffective-it is
futilely searching for another false center through a series of “violent hierarchies.”
Derrida suggests that this futility rests not in the inadequacies of this theory or that, but in
the search for a center at all, in our continual search for an original signifier we can re-view
and re-pair.
Derrida argues, “if no one can escape this necessity [of using the logic we seek to
dismantle], and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little he may
do so, this does not mean that all ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinence” (1988b:
397) Derrida offers deconstruction of the system of sign/signifier as the most pertinent
strategy for “giving in.” Derrida chooses to distinguish the “deconstruction” of binary
terms from the “bricolage” of Levi-Strauss. While Levi-Strauss surrenders the historical
opposition between nature and culture that has operated in his structural analysis of myths
because of the “scandal” of the incest prohibition, he nevertheless maintains its
methodological value. With this tool, Levi-Strauss becomes the “bricoleur [as opposed to
an engineer]. . .who uses the ‘means at hand,’ that is, the instruments he finds at his
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disposition around him, those which are already there,
. . .not hesitating to change them
whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once” (1988b: 400). The
engineer, in contrast-in opposition that is- “constructs the totality of his language, syntax,
and lexicon (1988b: 400). In contradistinction to Levi-Strauss’s critic-as-either bricoleur
or engineer, Derrida poses the deconstructionist. Deconstruction will be embraced,
[a]s soon as we cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse which
breaks with the received historical discourse, and as soon as we admit that every
finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and that the engineer and the
scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolage is menaced
and the difference it took on its meaning breaks down. (1988b: 400)
The opposition between bricoleur and engineer are broken down, but it is not “nothing” or
uncritical-ness that is left in their place. Rather, as Derrida suggests, “the passage beyond
philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy . . .but in continuing to read
philosophers in a certain way” (1988b: 403).
This “certain way” consists in surrendering a search for totalizing theory. The
impossibility of creating a totalizing philosophy, as Derrida reads it, is an opportunity for
“play.” Play becomes the purpose and the method of theorizing. From a literary critic’s
perspective, Samuel Delany describes this as a shift in the primary questions asked of a
text. If the modem period can be said to “begin” at the point when religious questions were
asked of aesthetics (having seen religion fail to make us better humans), then the
postmodern period may be seen as the point when neither organized religion nor aesthetics
could definitively answer the humanist (and fundamentally religious) questions of how we
become moral beings. Consequently, the primary aesthetic questions move into a tield of
play-a decentering and fragmenting of units like theme, tone, character, etc.4 In Derrida’s
field of play, signs continuously and infinitely take the center’s place and compound
meaning:
4These comments are paraphrased from an insightful class lecture by Prof. Samuel Delany at the
University of Massachusetts, May 16, 1995.
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[T^his movement of play, permitted by the lack or absence of a center or origin, is
the movement of supplementary. One cannot determine the center and exhaust
totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements it, taking
the center’s place in its absence-this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a
supplement. The movement of signification adds something, which results in the
fact that there is always more.
.
. (1987, 404)
Meaning, foi Derrida, is always deterred, always floating, and always being supplemented-
-it is always present and absent, identical and different, infinite in potential for
supplementation and finite in its very need to be supplemented. For the deconstructionist,
more meaning is always around the corner, always at play. Derrida describes the
alternative to the deconstructionist as one who “seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a
truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of sign, and which lives the necessity of
interpretation as an exile” (1987, 407) [my emphasis]. Interpretation may (and actually,
can’t help but) bring “deciphering dreams” to a text, but should be skeptical of ever having
those dreams wholly fulfilled.
In “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” (1989), Derrida
addresses the oft-asked questions concerning law, politics, and deconstruction. Derrida
directly faces the critics of deconstruction by proposing that a political venture is implicit in
the deconstructive method. Towards that end, Derrida suggests that the relationship
between law and deconstruction are inevitable. Derrida separates law from the justice
toward which it aspires and suggests that the force of violence is always inherent in law.
His argument that “there is no law without enforceability” may at first appear to be old
news, but under Derrida’s reasoning, law’s violence encodes the possibility of law’s own
deconstruction. The violent “of-this-world” force of law brings its supposed transcendent
authority, practices, and legitimacy down to earth:
The structure I am describing here is a structure in which law (droit) is essentially
deconstructible, whether because it is founded, constructed on interpre table and





For Derrida, the violence which both founds and underwrites law renders its existence
always in the past and in the future. The presence of law is always indeterminate,
conditional, and beyond our grasp. That is, the law is both grounded (in its past and future)
and transcendent (in its present). It is this lack of presence, or its “ghost-like” character
that makes law deconstructible. Derrida attempts to distinguish this “deconstructibility”
from justice and as justice:
We may even see this as a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress.
But the paradox that I d like to submit for discussion is the following: it is this
deconstructible structure of law,
. . .that also insures the possibility of
deconstruction.
. . .deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the
undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit (authority,
legitimacy, and so on). It is possible as an experience of the impossible, there
where, even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never does exist), there is
justice. Wherever one can replace, translate, determine the jc of justice, one should
say: deconstruction is possible. . .(1989: 15)
Derrida is arguing that at the moment one can argue “I am just” or “This is just” the
possibility of justice has been lost. The authorization of justice brings the
undeconstructible justice into the present and un-authorized world of law. This is not to
say that justice is natural and law conventional. Rather, Derrida would argue that such an
opposition is false since both nature and the law are implicit in the creation/negation of law.
Justice is simply “incalculable.” The attempt to calculate justice, unlike law, would require
venturing down non-roads, non-experience:
A will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn’t be an experience of
aporia would have no chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice. Every time
that something comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a
good rule to a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a
determinant judgment, we can be sure that the law may find itself accounted for, but
certainly not justice. (1989: 16)
Derrida argues that justice, rather than opposing law, actually stands as law's un-
experienced, un-experience-able aspiration. Justice, as aporia, insures law’s inevitable
deconstruction. Justice defines the space (or non-space) in which law is problematized. In
this problematizing, deconstruction questions.
16
the relation between force and form, between force and signification, performative
iljocutionary or perlocutionary force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of
affirmation by signature, but also and especially of all the paradoxical situations in
which the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange
places. . .It goes without saying that discourses on double affirmation, the gift
beyond exchange and distribution, the undecidable, the incommensurable or the
incalculable, or on singularity, difference and heterogeneity are also, through and
through, at least obliquely discourses on justice. (1989: 7)
With this ironic gesture, Derrida equates deconstructionist discourses with discourses on
justice, and necessarily, discourses on “ethics or politics” (1989: 7). The irony, of course,
lies in the persistent appeals by critics for Derrida to declare the “politics” of
deconstruction. For Derrida, deconstruction as a practice implicitly carries with it a set of
imperatives. Derrida argues that the “most necessary” acts of deconstruction do,
not remain enclosed in purely speculative, theoretical, and academic discourses but
rather. . .to aspire to something more consequential, to change things and to
intervene in an efficient and responsible, though always, of course, very mediated
way. . .Not, doubtless, to change things in the rather naive sense of calculated,
deliberate and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of maximum
intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of neither a simple
symptom nor a simple cause. .
.
(1989: 9)
Deconstruction, undeniably, can not change heads of state or economic structures. Such
changes, Derrida argues, would not amount to “real” changes anyway. The violence of
law, he argues, is not particular to one regime as opposed to another. The violence within
law ordains its existence-good or bad. Instead of replacing one law with another, then,
deconstructive politics expose the discursive contexts (rather than transcendental
authorities) through which “an industrialized and hyper-technologized society” (1989: 9)
functions, founds its laws, propels its future, and remains utterly deconstructible.
Derrida’s argument relies upon a re-envisioned notion of politics and ethics—
a
comprehension of the Other and an acceptance of the incalculability of universal themes like
justice.
In a rare moment of prescription, Derrida concludes “The Ends of Man (1982)
with a suggestion about what “new writing” might offer the field of interpretation. Derrida
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offers a choice between two strategies of deconstruction. The first involves deconstruction
“without changing the terrain, by repeating what is implicit in the founding concepts and
the original problematic, by using against the edifice the instruments or stones available in
the house, that is, equally, in language” (1982: 135). The second involves changing the
terrain “by brutally placing oneself outside” (1982: 135). The first choice will inevitably
risk co-optation and re-affirmation of the problematic “edifice.” The second requires a
limiting and potentially counter-productive blindness as the rejected structures creep into
the new terrain. Derrida finally admits that a combination of the two strategies must be
developed:
A new writing must weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction. Which
amounts to saying one must speak several languages and produce several texts at
once. . .because what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of “style”;
and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must be plural. (Ends, 135)
Like the “monster theory” suggested at the conclusion of “Structure, Sign, and Play,”
Derrida here offers a potentially political “style” of writing and reading texts. How does
feminist theory, with a political platform steeped in the universal rights of women, respond
to the lack of emphasis placed upon power relations in Derrida's work? Does this call for a
new style amount to a political or a philosophical change?
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c - Feminist theorize deconstruction
I have argued that core features of at least one version of Lacanian/Derridean
feminism should not be accommodated in the mix. For they work against some
decisive feminist purposes.
Nancy Fraser5
It is a mistake, then, to think that Derrida reduces Woman to the definition of lack
or fundamental nonidentity. Rather, he argues that “sex” and “gender” are not
identical. In the space of that separation we can open up further transformative
possibilities.
Drucilla Cornell6
This section will explore Fraser’s and Cornell’s criticism and promotion of
deconstruction using Fraser’s distinction between politics and the political as a frame of
reference. Situated on two decidedly different sides of the Derridean fence (a fence which,
Derrida might suggest, does not really exist), Nancy Fraser and Drucilla Cornell each
represent a feminist engagement with the method of deconstruction. Fraser, as a “socialist-
feminist and former New Left activist” (1989: 2), approaches deconstruction as the practice
of “transcendental philosophers” falsely claiming political commitment. Skeptical of
deconstructive methods, Fraser offers the framing questions through which deconstruction
(and textual politics) can be addressed. That is, Fraser describes deconstruction as a retreat
from politics (la politique
)
in favor of the political— “/£* politique
,
. . .the philosophical
interrogation of the political” (1989: 82). Cornell, with a background in Lacanian and
Derridean thought, has contributed to a postmodern (a label she would reject 7 )
jurisprudence and a theory of ethical feminism stemming from the view that “due to cliches
5 1995b: 167.
61992a: 287.
7See “Rethinking the Time of Feminism” in Feminist Contentions (1995).
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that have come to be associated with deconstruction, the usefulness of deconstruction to a
legitimate legal and political order has been dismissed” (1992b: 7). Cornell’s attempt to
undo the damage of these cliche readings by re-naming deconstruction “the philosophy of
the limit” (1992b: 1) addresses the political engagement she hopes both her text and
Derrida’s texts might be seen to encourage.
In “The French Derrideans: Politicizing Deconstruction or Deconstructing the
Political,” Fraser confronts the Derridean influence upon French scholars who made up the
short-lived Center for Philosophical Research on the Political-namely Jean-Luc Nancy and
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Beginning with a reading of the 1980 conference at Cerisy,
Fraser describes attempts made by participants to politicize deconstruction and their
“inevitable” regress into a deconstruction of the political. Focusing upon the dominant
voices of this conference (Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe), Fraser suggests that members of
the conference were not interested in political engagement, but rather in philosophical
inquiry. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe argue that in order to re-think the power of the state
“without assuming the ‘arche-teleological domination of the subject’” (1989: 80), one must
be prepared to deconstruct social bonds, to employ deconstruction “rigorously” to the
“political.” Such a rigorous deconstruction, Fraser argues,
refuse[s] the very genre of political debate. . .For there is one sort of difference that
deconstruction cannot tolerate: namely, difference as dispute, as good old-fashioned
political fight. And so, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe are utterly-one might say,
terribly-faithful to deconstruction in refusing to engage in political debate. (1989:
82)
Fraser smugly regards as her proof of this refusal of (and retreat from) politics the
suspension of the Center’s activities in 1984, four years after its inception. Interestingly,
Fraser “reads” the influence and use of deconstruction itself as the motor of the events
surrounding the conference at Cerisy and the Center’s demise. Rather than viewing
deconstruction as a method of analysis used by theories that then conflict and spar with one
another in the politics of conferences, centers, publishing houses, etc, Fraser argues that
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deconstruction’s inherent apolitical-ness is the cause of the Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s
retreat from politics:
Thus in their “Ouverture,” Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe sketch a program for
rethinking the political from the standpoint of deconstruction. It is a program that
in its punty and ngor, is far more faithful to the spirit of Derrida’s work than the
latter s own comparatively simplistic leftist remarks at Cerisy. But it also-indeed,
therefore—reveals all the more starkly the limitations of deconstruction as an outlook
seeking to confront the political. (1989: 81).
Fraser’s treatment lacks a discussion of deconstruction through a reading of Derrida’s own
work. However, she does include a response from Derrida at Cerisy concerning the
absence of a deconstructive analysis of Marxism. According to Fraser, Derrida suggested,
he did, and does, not want to weaken ‘what Marxism and the proletariat can
constitute as a force in France.’ Despite his distrust of the idea of revolution qua
metaphysical concept, he does not ‘devalue what [this idea] could contribute.
. .as a
force of ‘regroupment.’ (1989:74)
Fraser describes these remarks as simplistic. On the contrary, I think that Fraser too
smugly denies (or misreads) the importance of what Derrida himself described as a
“‘signifying blank. .
.
[a] blank [that] was not neutral.
. .It was a perceptible political
gesture’ ” (1989: 74). Derrida’s politics lie in his decision to deconstruct certain structures
while leaving others alone. The notion of an inevitability of signification, of differance , of
play does not require philosophers to barrel in and rigorously deconstruct everything in
sight. Rather, this method is used (or misused) according to decisions of theorists,
activists, real live people. The undecidability of language that makes deconstruction
possible is rigorous. Deconstruction-as a method-need not be. The rejection of Spivak's
political8 use of deconstruction at Cerisy is not an indictment of deconstruction—as Fraser
would have it be—but an indication of the politics at work at this particular conference.
8 Spivak asked deconstruction to investigate its own political “centered-ness,” that is, to
deconstruct the practice of deconstruction itself. Spivak argued that "a subtle reading ot Marx would reveal
a deconstructor avant la lettre.'" Following Marx, the politics of deconstruction, according to Spivak, would
be accessible once the scholars at Cerisy had ‘"confronted] the false other of philosophy (Fraser, 1989:
71).
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This conference was unwilling to support Spivak’s choice of deconstruction. Could
sexism have played a role in this? Ironically, Fraser does not ask.
While Fraser fails to ask why deconstruction was put to the uses it was by Nancy
and Lacoue-Labarthe, Cornell is especially concerned with questions of why-as they relate
to both deconstruction and the oppression of women more broadly. Cornell’s “ethical
feminism’’ employs Derrida’s concept of dijferance as it simultaneously affirms difference
while deferring static meanings of Other-ness. In The Philosophy of the Limit
,
Cornell
argues in greater detail that by re-naming deconstruction the “philosophy of the limit,” we
are challenged to “refocus attention on the limits constraining philosophical understanding,
rather than the negative preconceptions engendered by the notion of ‘deconstructing’”
(1992b: 1). We are challenged to “reopen the question-to think again” (1992b: 71). The
confounding aspect of such a re-thinking (for feminists such as Fraser) is the risk (if the
limit is taken seriously) of future deconstruction of any and all systems created even when
based upon “good” politics. Through deconstruction, Derrida “demonstrates how the very
establishment of the system as a system implies a beyond to it, precisely by virtue of what
it excludes” (1992b: 1). Cornell argues that while Derrida points out that any system
necessarily produces (and includes in its own self) an Other, this limit not only does not
produce political paralysis, but it actually contains “an ethical aspiration behind that
demonstration” (1992b: 2). Cornell suggests that in the perpetual creation of the Other, we
might find the figure of mouming-not for ourselves, but for others because we can only
mourn the death of others, never ourselves. Mourning, as a critical practice, is a reminder
of our own death-of the ultimate limit. For Derrida, Antigone is the classical mourner who
allegorically suggests another relationship-that of the Other and Woman:
Derrida sews together his “reading effect”. . .as a gift to her, to open up another
way of reading--Woman. Not, however, so he can give us that reading, but instead
so that Woman can finally be heard when she speaks for herself and in her own
name. . . .It is the Other that leaves within us the trace that we recall. Here again.
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Derrida is emphasizing the precedence of the Other to the subject. The subject only
comes to himself by recalling Her. (1992b: 76)
This deconstruction of the Meaning-ful Self can only multiply the recollections of the
Other. In these recollections, the distance between self and other are maintained in order to
avoid seeing “her” as simply part of “his” field of vision. Derrida’s “is the ‘auratic gaze’
that preserves her otherness by respecting her distance, and that by doing so conjures up
the ‘memory’ of a different world, in which she is not seen by man as merely his Other,
mirrored in his eyes. . .The Other is allowed to be in her distance precisely so that she can
look back” (1992b: 77).
Cornell derives a feminist politics from this Derridean framework and suggests a re-
imagining of Woman’s absence from the Lacanian symbolic:
Without a challenge to the very definition of the feminine as the “castrated other”
and heterosexuality as the norm, there is no true possibility of overcoming that
shame. . .Given the connection in the Lacanian analysis between sex, gender
identity, and heterosexuality, this experience of shame is not only that of women,
as already suggested, but is also shared by those who live outside the heterosexual
matrix. (1992b: 288)
For Cornell, Lacanian theory answers the question of why there is a gap between the
constructions of woman and the lived experience of women. Without an understanding of
the encoded, psychoanalytic explanations of women's identification as Lack, Cornell
argues, feminist politics will continue to flounder in its struggle for some Habermasian
ideal that fails to comprehend the complexities of gender inequity: “The attraction of Lacan
to feminists is that he offers us powerful cultural narrative of why the struggle to expand
the symbolizations of the feminine within sexual difference has been so difficult” (1995a:
95). The phallus, for Lacan, is the transcendental signifier that has no “positive existence"
but is masculinized (identified as the penis) as Woman becomes the Castrated Other void of
meaning, an example of that which can not be known. Described as a bar by Lacan,
Cornell suggests that the bar is a metaphor and that actually, this bar or limit to meaning can
be described only through metaphor and allegory. Changing those allegories or
writing
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new stories might be a key to how the cultural narrative that forces women’s subordination
could be undermined or destroyed.
Derrida finds space within Lacan for new and different narratives. While Lacan’s
theory alone might render Woman the forever-unsignified, Cornell adds Derrida’s reading
of Lacan in which he argues that idea of the “barred woman” is “an expression of the law
of the phallus”-a law which Derrida deconstructs:
[Derrida’s] deconstruction is of Lacan’s philosophical claim that these codes of
representation will be shielded from the iterability of their meaning. The bar itself
cannot be conceptualized as an absolute limit. We can only know the bar as a
metaphor, and like all metaphors the excess inherent in the identification through
transference points beyond itself. Thus paradoxically, the limit recedes before its
linguistic expression. (1995a: 94)
That there can be no absolute signifier barring meaning from or conferring “lack” upon
Woman does not erase Woman nor does it create one transcendent meaning, but instead,
Derrida’s notion of differance multiplies meaning for women and for men. Cornell argues
that such a reconfiguration and rejection of the transcendent has a great deal to offer
feminism:
But there is an ethical moment in the endless demonstration of this paradox. It is
the significance of this ethical moment that is particularly crucial to feminism. The
demonstration of the limit of meaning loosens the binds of convention. . .As the
boundary recedes, we have more space to dream and re-imagine our forms of life.
The very impossibility of knowing the boundaries that guarantee meaning is
unsettling if one seeks security in an established world of sense. But as feminists
know only too well, we have been tied down by the bounds of meaning of
femininity. . .we have every reason to push against and beyond the boundaries.
(Cornell, 1995a: 95)
The politics of deconstruction, as far as feminism is concerned, is a congruous ethical
commitment to destabilizing seemingly fixed understandings. While ethical feminism
imagines a “nonviolent relationship to the Other,” Cornell contends that she is not
advocating (or even imagining that she could expound) one absolute system of rules.
Instead, Cornell offers attitudes of fallibility linked with musement which create both
ethical and political actions. Judgments are not deferred or ignored, but are guided by an
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understanding of the limits to any claim of Truth and by a Derridean deconstruction of the
violence inherent in the self/Other dualism.
The “philosophy of the limit” that Cornell describes and advocates is neither neutral
nor groundless. It does not exist for its own sake, but carries within it an ethical treatment
of Othemess-a treatment being called for by contemporary political debates especially
within feminism and critical race theory. Reading and writing, according to this
understanding of deconstruction, carries with it an ethical, but not a moralizing,
prerogative. The “play” of deconstruction, far from withdrawing from politics, actually
offers a strong indictment of traditional politics--a politics which relies upon metaphysical
origins and transcendent truth claims. Fraser has suggested that Cornell’s use of
deconstruction towards an ethical, even utopian end fails to,
theorize actually existing cultural contestation among competing significations that
are on par with one another.
. .For if all of conscious language is
phallogocentrically genderized, then the only acceptable alternative is the “Wholly
Other.” (Fraser, 1995a: 165)
Fraser reads Cornell as re-establishing a gender binarism in which Woman’s “otherness”
becomes her essential property. That is, Woman as Other could never-within current
language structures-engage in (let alone win) political contests. Yet, Fraser argues, we
know that women do this every day. Fraser’s criticism, however, follows from a
misreading of both Cornell and Derrida. When Cornell calls for a “new ‘feminine
Symbolic which feeds off the feminine imaginary’ ” (Fraser, 1995a: 165), she is not, I
believe, essentializing what it would mean to be feminine-though it might first appear that
way. Rather, Cornell is speaking in Lacanian terms through which the feminine is the great
unsignified, the empty set. A new feminine symbolic would simply (or not so simply)
address the fiction of the phallus as transcendental signifier and “mak[e] that process of
resymbolization possible” (Cornell, 1995b: 151). Cornell writes:
the phallus is erected only as the transcendental signifier through a erasing of what
the mother desires, and that her desire is read within a pre-given script that
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translates desire through the grid of the already established symbolic But what is
read can always be reread.
. .there can be no “autonomy” for women without the
re-evaluation of our “sex” and with this re-evaluation the redefinition of the ideal of
autonomy. (1995b: 151)
Far from offering an essential notion of what that “sex” or “autonomy” would be, Cornell
places these words in quotation marks and suggests that the very investigation of these
words will necessarily open up entirely new conceptions of their meaning and value.
Reading and re-reading, for Cornell as well as Derrida, is not a passive dalliance, but rather
is a throwing into disarray “established” meanings and accepted dualisms. With
deconstruction as your method, Cornell argues, reading becomes a political gesture-a
productive activity with the potential “power” to renegotiate what we think, or if we think at
all, of “the political.”
Before returning to the method of deconstruction and the reading of personal legal
narratives, Chapters Three and Four explore jurisprudence as texts, practices, and a frame
within which personal legal narratives are written and read. These chapters explore the
lexicon of legal theorists in an attempt to discover the ways legal texts are interpreted and
the ways theoretical boundaries between politics and law are maintained.
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CHAPTER III
THE TEMPTATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE
A coherent political theory, such as might be used to justify the law of a community
as a whole, must be grounded at bottom either in some idea of the collective welfare
of citizens, or in some conception of their political and social rights, or in some
theory of their moral duties.
Ronald Dworkin9
A. Introduction
In this chapter, jurisprudence is divided according into two temptations, the
justifying and the critical. Further, the temptations of jurisprudence have been divided
according to three dominant tasks—an explanation, often justification, of legal practices vs.
a critique and rejection of legal practices vs. the introduction of different legal identities to
both the explanation and critique. Whether or not the law can be called “political” has been
an on-going theme in each of these battles. Traditional scholars argue that while politics
exist in the legislative and executive branches and may even exist in the bedroom and the
boardroom, politics has failed to undermine the distinct and neutral character of legal
practices and legal knowledge. This distinction between law and politics has been
mythologized into aphorisms like “No one is above the law”-not governors of southern
states, not Presidents of the United States, not famous ex-football players. . .obviously,
the myth and the experience are not identical. But, myths are never intended to be identical
with experience. Rather, myths are,
a kind of story. . .through which a culture ratifies its social customs or accounts for
the origins of human and natural phenomena usually. . .in boldly imaginative
terms. . .a myth is a false or unreliable story or belief. . . (Baldick, 1990: 143)
9Dworkin, 1977: 13.
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Because of their air of falsity, there is always more than one myth available. Like the
culture from which they emerge, myths are adaptable and contestable. In legal culture, the
dominant myth of “finding law” outside of politics remains staid in some circles-Supreme
Court nomination hearings and formalist jurisprudence. Other schools of jurisprudence,
however, have struggled to replace the traditional myth with one of their own, to create a
new story around which law might be understood. This chapter organizes jurisprudence
as a set of temptations toward legal myth-making.
Rather than a steady or enlightened evolution from one school of thought to
another, legal theory has been drawn from a myriad of contesting discourses including
common law, positivism, social science and the contemporary scholarship of literary
critics, critical legal scholars (CLS), critical race and feminist scholars. Despite the
sweeping disciplines from which legal theory borrows, “jurisprudence’s major
constituency is clearly a legal professional one” (Cotterell, 1992: 5). Because of legal
theory’s cloistered character, the instinct toward creating disciplinary “distinct-ness” has
remained prevalent even after the introduction of different legal identities-e.g. women and
people of color. Rather than a response to broad social and political movements, political
movements in legal theory corresponded with a shifts in the professional communities of
law--i.e., the introduction of women and minorities into law schools, lawyering, and law
school teaching. Thus, legal theorizing-even from “different voices”-has remained an
practice of elite scholars 10 within the legal academy. The “insider" perspective of
10 If legal theorists constitute such an ivory-towered minority, how have these scholars (or have
they at all) influenced the legal profession? Why not look to the practitioners of law-the public defender,
the “hired-gun” defense attorney, the courthouse clerk? Many scholars have done just that. Social science
behavioralists and legal anthropologists have conducted “gap studies” and performed participant observation
to locate gaps between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be. The latter, in fact, points exactly
toward an explanation of why legal theory does matter. That is, jurisprudence has had an undeniable role in
constructing what we believe law ought to be, what it ought to do for us, and how we ought to behave
toward it. Many of these “gap” studies proved only too well that what legal theory had told us about the
law was at best, utopian and at worse, patently false. The “insider” character of legal theory and its impetus
toward justification rather than critique has been challenged again and again during the past century.
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jurisprudence, however, has not always been the case. The common law tradition relied
upon broader communities and representative practitioners to construct the law’s meaning.
Common law has stood as both a foil and a springboard to modem notions of
justice and substantive law. Common law is a pre-literate, pre-legislative constellation
based upon contextualized facts and “community values.” The English legal tradition bases
itself upon theorists such as Sir William Blackstone and his explication of “common law.”
These ideas helped to construct and delimit American legal consciousness. Common law is
defined as:
a body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished
from legislative enactments. The “common law”
. . .consists of those principles,
usage, and rules of action applicable to government and security of persons and
property which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive
declaration of the will of the legislature. (Black’s Law Dictionary , 276)
Common law is drawn from particular cases in particular societies and relies upon accepted
social values or natural reason. Judges, rather than legislatures, were the driving force
behind common law decisions. Consequently, the emphasis was upon the decision or
judicial response, rather than upon the rules which guide or inhibit those decisions.
Judicial behavior under common law is a reactive process. Common law judges were
educated by their community and represented that community’s values. As such, the
common law judge “interprets and applies the law but does not create it, for the law has no
individual authors. It is the product of the community grounded in history” (Cotterell,
1992: 25).
In the Anglo-american tradition, common law can be closely aligned to the
philosophical maxims of natural law. Natural law collapses moral and legal questions.
The “slogan” (Soper, 1984: 51) often associated with natural law perspective-“an unjust
law is not law”-places the will of the individual and his or her own morality at the center of
law, rather than a secular judge, legislator, or sovereign. That is, natural law asserts that
legislated laws are secondary both to man’s own sense of right and wrong and to the
29
ultimate adjudicator, God. During the seventeenth century, the western world as
community” had as its moral center a liberal notion of natural laws and “the rights of
man. That is, natural and common law was something not residing in rules but in more
fundamental principles expressing a transcendent reason or ancient wisdom” (Cotterell,
1992: 120). Consequently, many of the tenets of common law which founded the “new
world are derived from a theory of individual rights, human reason, and a vague notion of
the common good. The ambiguous nature of natural law and common law, what Cotterell
describes as “only a set of truisms that indicate broad areas in which some kind of
regulation must, as a matter of natural necessity, exist” (1992: 145), as well as an
increasing professionalization of legal practices, spawned the critique of common law by a
new science of pro-active or positive rules.
The grounding of the law in science, rights, or political identity has been a recurring
temptation for legal theory during the past one hundred years. Whether religious,
positivist, or anti-racist in character, jurisprudence has attempted either to justify or criticize
legal practices. In both cases, theories have improved our understanding of law,
standardized that understanding, and rendered “law” a distinct knowledge. Rather than
promoting one or another of these attempts, I have contextualized legal theory by
representing what I will call the temptations of jurisprudence. By exploring legal theory as
a set of disciplinary temptations, I hope to articulate the reading and writing “constraints”
around which personal legal narratives operate. Michael Shapiro (1992) argues that present
meaning emerges from “well-entrenched historical scripts.” In order to locate the possible





Drawing heavily upon the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, nineteenth-century
jurist John Austin aspired toward a scientific law. A science of law would place a set of
organized and systematic rules, rather than common customs and ambiguous precedents, at
the center of a judge’s decisions. Austin narrowed his concerns to the rules created and
administered by the sovereign, to positive laws, and located these concerns within the field
of jurisprudence. Cotterell explains:
The most significant category of human laws comprises what Austin calls positive
law. These are laws set by political superiors acting as such or by people acting in
pursuance of legal rights conferred on them by political superiors (that is, acting as
the delegates of political superiors in making laws). , . .only positive law is the
appropriate concern of what Austin considers to be jurisprudence. (1993: 59)
Austin does not ignore laws that fall outside of the bounds of sovereign will, but rather
labels these laws differently, i.e. as positive morality . Law, for Austin, is a command
made by a political superior whose power is delegated to judges. This systematized
jurisprudence relied upon a pre-legal antecedent embodied in an authoritative, highly
centralized government (Cotterell: 1993, 52-82). Practical for consolidated monarchies,
Austin’s theory proved less so for the decentralized authority of twentieth-century liberal
democracies. While positive or scientized law maintained its appeal, the narrow definition
of law as a sovereign command gave way to broader, more “open-textured” (Hart, 1965)
interpretation.
As Oxford chair of jurisprudence from 1953 to 1968, H.L.A. Hart's contribution to
jurisprudence grew from a similar vision of positivist law and the distinction between law
and morality. Labelled analytical (as opposed to sociological) jurisprudence, positivist
thought demanded a theoretical explanation for those aspects of law which did not tit within
the rubrics of a command. Breaking with Austin, Hart rejected law as sovereign-centered
commands and argued that law was a collection of rules (Cotterell, 1993). Hart drew upon
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the philosophy of language and sought to contextualize legal decisions in the actual
practices of judges, to create new resources for a more realistic analysis of legal concepts”
(Cotterell, 1993: 89). From these linguistic practices. Hart asserted that “the concept of
law” could be defined according to two types of cases, the core and the penumbra. The
core or concrete case was solved or decided according to a determinate set of rules. Those
cases with “a penumbra of uncertainty” required “the rule-making authority [to] exercise
discretion” (Hart, 1961: 132). Rules, according to Hart, are a step beyond commands.
As a society becomes more complex, the “primary rules” (or Austin’s commands) give way
to secondary rules which allow for change or evolution and adjudication when things do
not go as planned. The latter rules are “power-conferring,” rather than “duty-imposing,”
and become open to interpretation. As Cotterell argues, the conferee of power is itself open
to interpretation since Hart appears to suggest that his system of rules becomes self-
propagating and self-governed:
The rule of recognition and the other secondary rules are seen as governing the
entire process of production, interpretation, enforcement, amendment and repeal of
rules within the legal system. In contrast to Austin’s picture of a legal order as the
expression and instrument of all-too-human political power (the power of the
sovereign and its delegates). Hart’s image of law is that of a system in which rules
govern power-holders; in which rules, rather than people, govern. (Cotterell,
1993: 99)
This portrayal of rules, rather than people, organizing the legal system establishes law as a
specialized and scientific knowledge. That is, if rules determine judicial decision, judges
must become accountable to this body of rules. Decisions are no longer the will of the
sovereign, but neither are they the will of every random judge. Judicial decision-making
becomes, in Hart’s theory, something to be learned and guarded. Still, Hail does not
suggest that judges locate “law” as if it is some pre-existing gestalt. Hart writes,
Fact situations do not await us neatly labelled, creased, and folded, nor is their legal
classification written on them to be simply read off by the judge. Instead, in
applying legal rules, someone must take the responsibility of deciding that words
do or do not cover some case in hand with all the practical consequences involved
in this decision. (1958:23).
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Hart walks the very thin line between judges’ specialized knowledge (in the case of
penumbra) and an over-riding legal formalism. Hart maintains that formalism, or the core
case, is, for lack of a better word, the rule rather than the exception.
Despite his allowance for judicial discretion in the “penumbra” cases. Hart
steadfastly maintains his conviction that many cases could be and, in fact, were decided
according to a rule of law (Hart, 1958). Hart argued that penumbra cases were decided
according to a rational inclination toward what law “ought to be.” The “ought” which is
drawn upon in making these decisions, however, is not the “ought” of moralistic, common
law claims. Rather, “[t]he word ‘ought’ merely reflects the presences of some standard of
criticism; one of these standards is a moral standard, but not all standards are moral” (Hart,
1958: 27). The standards presented to judges and, one imagines, for legal theorists in
general remain inside and specific to the legal realm. Law, in the Hart’s positivist
scheme, stands immune to the moral convictions of one or another judge and wedded to
and constrained by the rules and standards that have evolved with it. As Sopel suggests:
“Hart is willing to say that. . .it is possible that judges might even admit that the rules they
accept are immoral yet continue to enforce them” (1984: 35). Nevertheless, Hart refuses
to overstate the role of penumbra in the everyday practice of law. He argues instead that
the exaggeration of the number of penumbra cases misdirects analysis away from the rules
that undeniably constrain legal decisions:
And preoccupation with the penumbra is. . .as rich a source of confusion in the
American legal tradition as formalism in the English. Of course we might abandon
the notion that rules have authority; we might cease to attach force or even meaning
to an argument that a case falls clearly within a rule and the scope of a precedent.
We might call all such reasoning ‘automatic’ or ‘mechanical,’ which is already the
routine invective of the courts. But until we decide that this is what we want, we
should not encourage it by obliterating the Utilitarian distinction [between law and
morals]. (1958: 29)
Hart, however, does not clarify his point with anything other than hypothetical cases. Hart
remains firmly in the philosophical mode. As Cotterell suggests: Thus, theie is no ieal
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clarification of the relationship between rule and discretion, certainty and uncertainty in
law” (1993: 106). Jurisprudence becomes further complicated by a critique of positivism
as the questions of discretion and interpretation are more closely addressed.
2. righting positivism
Replacing Hail as chair of jurisprudence at Oxford and remaining in that position
today, Ronald Dworkin has displaced Hart’s legal positivism by “restructuring.
. .common
law thought” (Cotterell, 1993: 151) and establishing a theory of rights, rather than rules.
Dworkin complicates the positivist position that law is a set of rules that are capable of
determinate meaning and application. He argues instead that rights are a precursor to rules
and inform their use. Cotterell explains:
Rights, for Dworkin, are thus antecedent to and give meaning to legal rules. His
rejection of the model of rules is not expressed, like [Roscoe] Pound’s, as a claim
that law contains more than rules. It is a claim that law is more fundamental than
rules and that rules are incomplete and problematic expressions of the content of
law. (1993: 168)
Dworkin rejects positivism’s idealization of judicial rules as fundamental to judicial
decisions. Rules should not be found to explicate principles that follow them in logic and
in practice. Rather, it is principles of the common law variety so eagerly ignored by the
positivist tradition that direct us toward rules:
If no rule of recognition [Hart’s concept] can provide a test for identifying
principles, why not say that principles are ultimate, and form the rule of recognition
in our law? The answer to the general question ‘What is valid law in an American
jurisdiction?’ would then require us to state all the principles (as well as ultimate
constitutional rules) in force in that jurisdiction at the time, together with appropriate
assignments of weight. (1967: 64)
Dworkin first divides cases into soft and hard and then suggests that, especially in regards
to hard cases, law consists of “principles, policies, and other sorts of standards” (Dworkin,
1967: 43). While rules have an either-or, black-or-white quality, principles are more fluid.
Principles articulate social goals, rather than judicial directives. Principles have varying
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social weight and, consequently, can be related to one another should two principles come
into conflict. The question when a conflict occurs is not, as in rules, which one applies,
but rather which principle has more social value? Dworkin argues that rules can not be
compared:
one legal rule may be more important than another because it has greater or more
important role in regulating behavior. But we cannot say that one rule is more
important than another within the system of rules, so that when two rules conflict,
one supersedes the other by virtue of its greater weight. (1967: 48)
Dworkin offers examples of each concept. He contrasts a legal rule: “A will is invalid
unless signed by three witnesses” with a legal principle: “A man may not profit from his
own wrong” (1967: 48). While both standards serve as guide-posts for judicial decision-
making, the latter invites interpretation and steps outside the parameters of a sovereign
command. Judicial interpretation, however, does not draw upon the judge’s politics, social
values, or any extra-legal knowledge. Dworkin takes issue with positivists’ use of the term
‘discretion’ to explain judicial decisions on hard cases.
Discretion, according to Dworkin, has been not only over-emphasized, but misused
in describing judicial behavior. Dworkin asserts that principles, not discretion, help to
explain judicial behavior when it can not be explained by uniform rules. And, principles,
unlike discretion, are legal concepts dependent upon and constitutive of a legal context:
A principle like ‘No man may profit from his own wrong’ does not even purport to
set out conclusions that make its application necessary. Rather, it states a reason
that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision. . .There
may be other principles or policies arguing in the other direction. . .If so, our
principle may not prevail, but that does not mean that it is not a principle of our
legal system, because in the next case, when these contravening considerations are
absent or less weighty, the principle may be decisive. All that is meant, when we
say that a particular principle is a principle of law, is that the principle is one which
officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one
direction or another. (Dworkin, 1967: 47)
Legal principles construct the content and constraints of judges' choices. Principles, unlike
rules, do not tether a judge to one choice, but neither do they leave judicial decisions (in
hard cases) entirely up to discretion. While admitting that many more questions iemain
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regarding which principles count and where we find them, Dworkin argues that
positivism’s theoretical weakness lies in its concept of discretion because it “stops short of
just those puzzling, hard cases that send us looking for theories of law” (Dworkin, 1967:
65). In his later work on judicial interpretation, Dworkin begins to offer his own answers
to these “puzzling” questions.
Contrary to the rule-centered law articulated by legal positivists, Dworkin replaces
the judge or legal actor as the center of the decision-making process. Principles carry
fundamental weight in Dworkin’s scheme, but are by definition open to conflict and
judgment. Nevertheless, judges choose legal principles and locate facts within a system of
interpretation. This system contains “propositions of law” which, for Dworkin, do not
follow from sovereign intentions (as Austin argued), nor do they follow (except in the
more simple cases) from description of “some event of a designated law-making kind”
(what Hart might call a legal rule). Instead, propositions of law are derived from an
interpretive act. Dworkin draws from literary interpretation and suggests that the
interpretive act is performed in order to make the interpreted text or work of art better in
some way. This critical impulse is, therefore, grounded in a philosophical frame-work-a
conception of good and better art: “. . .anyone called upon to defend a particular approach
to interpretation would be forced to rely on more general aspects of a theory of art, whether
he realizes it or not” (Dworkin, 1982: 536). Dworkin rejects, however, an interpretive
school which relies upon authorial intention to affix meaning to a text. Dworkin’s distaste
for psychological interpretation becomes more instrumental as he connects literary criticism
to legal interpretation. In neither case does Dworkin believe it possible to secure an
author’s intention or attitude for any length of time. Consequently, interpretive conclusions
relying upon authorial intention become ephemeral and ineffectual. Dworkin likens legal
interpretation to a group of authors working collectively on one narrative. Each author
writes one chapter and then passes the text along for the next to interpret and then to
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supplement. The interpretive process, for both legal and literary texts, must be guided by
past texts. Dworkin explains:
Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or she must read through what
other judges in the past have written not simply to discover what these judges have
said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an opinion about what
these judges have collectively done, in the way that each of our novelists formed an
opinion about the collective novel so far written.
. .Each judge must regard himself,
in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of





Judges, while at the center of the interpretive process, are not lone rangers searching the
countryside for brash new forms of justice. They are constrained by the first author, the
constitution, a preceding case, a legal principle. In other words, judges are locked inside
“the proposition of law” and must draw their interpretations, their very existence from that
body of knowledge: “He must interpret what has gone before because he has a
responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction
of his own” (Dworkin, 1982: 542). Nevertheless, judges are not automatons. They arrive
at decisions with their own “legal philosophy,” an amalgamation of political theory, legal
history, and the institutional constraints and responsibilities with which he or she lives.
Dworkin’s legal theory paints the judge as a stoic, but active reader, immersed in law and
balancing (but not ignoring) his or her own political impulses. This shift in legal theory
from rules to principles, from sovereign to judge does not, however, shift legal theory’s
predominant emphasis on normative and insider jurisprudence.
Austin, Hart, and Dworkin maintain a descriptive, scientific disposition, what
Philip Soper (1984) has regarded as legal theory’s distinction from moral or political
theory. Each of the theorists discussed so far have constructed theories that were meant to
justify law’s role and prevalence in their societies. In doing so, they have each attempted to
systematize legal knowledge and to establish the “legal” as a distinct and professional field
of knowledge-guarded from social and political intrusion. In that sense, each has been
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tempted to view legal theory as a scientific enterprise, to supplement the law in a specific
and explanatory way. The result-often intended, sometimes not-of such theory is a
cultural narrative which excludes “outsider,” non-legal knowledge. During the late
nineteenth century, this inward turn toward specialized legal knowledge can be associated
with the trend toward scientized knowledge more generally (see Foucault, 1979). It can be
further associated with attempts to professionalize the law and the controversies
surrounding the creation of specialized schools for the sole purpose of training lawyers
(Fisher, 1993). The more precise and scientific the knowledge associated with
jurisprudence generally, the greater the need and rationale for professional lawyers. Within
mainstream legal theory, as Dworkin’s work suggests, normative theory directed toward
lawyers, judges, and academic jurists (“insiders”) has remained dominant as has the
narrow focus upon law and precedent as the only “relevant” knowledge. During the past
century, however, analytical legal theory has been disrupted by progressive lawyers, social
scientists, and other “outsider” voices.
C. Temptations: Criticizing jurisprudence
1. legal realism: replacing the mvth of law
American legal realism evolved in the 1920’s from criticisms of formalist legal
theory by jurists Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes. While these “sociological”
theories turned a skeptical eye toward the legal formalism best represented at the time by
Harvard law professor Christopher Columbus Langdell, legal realists attacked legal
formalism and the Rule of Law not only with a progressive political agenda, but with an
entirely new epistemological framework. The science of law, legal realists argued, should
be a social science, not a science of rigid rules and “found” law. Realism was often
misrepresented by traditional theorists, such as Hart (1958) as being singularly interested in
judicial role and the debunking of mechanical jurisprudence or formalism. This was.
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undeniably, the ultimate criticism lodged against early twentieth-century law, but legal
realists proposed a myriad of criticisms and analyses of legal practices and jurisprudence.
The “birth” of legal realism has been associated with a scholarly debate between Pound and
Karl Llewellyn (Fisher, 1993). Pound’s somewhat dismissive account of legal realism.
Realist Jurisprudence (1931), in the Harvard Law Review provoked a response by
Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, “Some Realism About Realism” (1931), which
systematically confronted and disproved each of Pound’s descriptions of legal realism
while announcing several, albeit vague, realist motivations. All the while, Llewellyn
insisted, “A group philosophy or program, a group credo of social welfare, these realists
have not. They are not a group” (1931: 75).
Legal Realists, nevertheless, have been remembered as “a group.” Primarily a
movement of leftist law professors, especially from Columbia and Yale, legal realists were
responding to the dominant judicial fervor of the day, classical legal thought. It was this
mode of judicial reasoning that delivered the conservative, business-friendly decisions like
Lochner vs. New York, which established the supposedly non-political, purely legal
concept “liberty of contract.” The supposedly non-political nature of this ruling was legal
realists’ first point of attack. Realists argued:
Lochner was wrong because it involved judicial partisan decision making: the
court decided the case by favoring the ideology of laissez-faire economics. The
realists contended that the problem with this way of thinking was not just judicial
activism, but the way the Court conceptually defined the word “liberty” in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Minda, 1995: 27)
Legal realists took issue with the “concepf’-ualizing of law into steadfast legal rules. Life
was too contradictory to allow for “the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations
are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions” (Llewellyn, 1931: 73). This
criticism led realists to suggest other reasons for jurists and judges to employ the Rule of
Law in their analyses: “This involves the tentative adoption of the theory of rationalization
for the study of opinions” (Llewellyn, 1931: 73). That is, realists suggested that [b]y
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making each decision seem inevitable, opinions deflect popular criticism of the courts’
rulings and conceal from the judges themselves the true bases of their rulings” (Fisher,
1993: 165). Legal realists not only criticized the legal system, but offered several avenues
toward change. One of the most radical asserted that judicial decisions should promote
social and political goals—and that these goals and attitudes be transparent, rather than
opaque and guarded by so-called “rule of law” deduction. Realists believed that “social
values are implicated by every legal issue” (Fisher, 1993: 171) and that some explicit vision
of the common good was absolutely crucial to legal reasoning. Without it, implicit
encouragement of conservative and anti-worker political agendas and would remain beyond
reproach (and political debate). Jerome Frank likened classical legal reasoning to “father-
authority” and, in his important 1930 text Law and the Modem Mind, proclaimed:
Myth-making and fatherly lies must be abandoned-the Santa Claus story of
complete legal certainty; the fairy tale of a pot of golden law which is already in
existence and which the good lawyer can find, if only he is sufficiently diligent; the
phantasy of an aesthetically satisfactory system and harmony, consistent and
uniform, which will spring up when we find the magic wand of a rationalizing
principle. We must stop telling stork-fibs about how law is bom and cease even
hinting that perhaps there is still some truth in Peter Pan legends of a juristic happy
hunting ground in the land of legal absolutes. (1930: 207)
This inspiring prose offers a glimpse into the brash and radical claims being railed by legal
realists against their older mentors. Legal realists attempted to dispel legal myths and
discover the reality of law-that legal truths were subject to and made up of social and
political interests. Unfortunately, this reasoning, however accurate it might be, left realists
with an epistemological quandary. Their debunking of the “myth of law left law without
a “truth claim” upon which to stand—and, consequently, left legal realists without an
authoritative legal claim to religious freedom, worker’s right, their own political vision of
the common good that they believed law should work to support. Many realists had
deeply-held political and moral beliefs steeped in progressive politics, Marxism, and social
and religious freedom. That is, legal realists rejected the legal “myth-making” of formalist
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jurisprudence, but did not see their own political interests as seeking similar mythical
goals—if in the opposite political direction. Legal realists sought to replace the story of
legal neutrality with a story of individual freedom. After rejecting formalism as “myth,”
legal realist could not make a theoretical case for their political goals having precedence
over any others. This theoretical problem as well as legal realists’ rejection of a “group”
identity led to their losing relevance during the 1950’s and 1960’s.
As suggested by the positions of Hart and Dworkin as the prevailing voices of
jurisprudence, legal realism did not turn jurisprudence away from classical legal reasoning.
Many Supreme Court nominees, especially those nominated by conservative presidents,
maintain the image-at least during their hearings-of the “myth of law.” While it may be
surprising that Clarence Thomas would testify that he had never thought about the abortion
issue because he had never judged a decision concerning abortion, it is more telling that the
majority of Americans, media, and Congress did not challenge this claim as ludicrous-
something legal realists undoubtedly would have done. Nevertheless, legal realism did
have a profound impact upon strains of, especially American, legal thought. The law and
economics movement, legal anthropology, the law and society movement each owes its
inception in part to the introduction of social science into the legal arena. It was only in the
late 1970’s, however, that the more radical strain of legal realism re-emerged in the law
schools of the United States. Critical Legal Studies re-introduced legal skepticism into the
academy and served as a springboard for other “postmodern” legal movements (Minda,
1995).
2. critical legal studies: rejecting law
Critical Legal Scholars (CLS), a group made up almost exclusively of law
professors and lawyers, emerged in the late 1970’s. The scholarship encompasses such
diverse efforts at non-traditional legal theory that the introduction to the 1987 Stanford Law
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Review symposium on CLS wrote: “[A]ny attempt to reduce these ideas to some universal
characterization would only destroy much of the rich detail of these writings.”
Nevertheless, recurring ideas have taken form during the past two decades. The abundance
and radical tendencies of CLS writing and the impassioned response from both the right
and the left has chiselled a place for Crits alongside the non-conformists of the tum-of-
the-century s Legal Realism movement (see Kairys, 1982). CLS, like legal realism, hopes
to illustrate the inability of “formalism” to accurately represent social/legal issues.
CLS scholarship starts from the premise that legal theory is an ideological product,
part of the process through which unequal and unjust relationships are produced
and reproduced in society.
. .The issue is: How does one carry on transformative
politics in legal theory? (Trubek, n/d: 33)
Law, according to critical legal studies, does not gain its power from an Austinian
sovereign, nor from inherent or God-given natural rights. CLS differs from legal realism
in that CLS does not look to replace those who have abused the power of law with others
who would not. Instead, CLS accepts a more complex definition of power in law and in
other social relationships. Power, simultaneously derived from and extant in everything,
does not stand with totalizing “sovereignty.” Torres describes the productive power of law
in his description of CLS:
The formal neutrality at the foundation of legal discourse hides the distributive
choices which are made. In this way, law accomplishes political ends while
effectively divorcing itself from political means. . .Law does not stand outside the
process of legitimation, for it is both producer and product of the dominant social
culture. Legal culture and institutions are. . .important elements in the function of
both popular beliefs about commonplace relationships and popular acquiescence to
the existing distribution of social goods and power. In this construction, law is the
mechanism for legitimizing the existing hierarchy of social relations and, hence, for
crystallizing existing patterns of domination. (Torres, 1988: 1051)
CLS, then, rejects the notion of Truth in Law. Not only do the politics of legal actors and
the arena from which they come affect justice, but the law itself preordains certain
conclusions and expectations. Judges’ attitudes and litigants’ relative power each affect the
distribution of justice. The actors are, in effect, playing with a loaded deck. According to
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David Kairys (1982), evidence of this distortion is excused by American society as a
“deviation from the idealized [formalist] model” (Kairys, 1982: 2). The ability of an
idealized system to re-invent and re-legitimize itself speaks to the productive capabilities of
power. Law’s role in upholding American power structures is extremely important to CLS
writers.
In the CLS volume The Politics of Law (1982), Duncan Kennedy writes of the
hierarchal nature of legal education and the ideological implications of “thinking like a
lawyer. Rational and logical modes of thinking and reasoning are appropriate and revered
while approaches traceable to illogic or the irrational generate ridicule for their “non-legal”
perspective. CLS scholars suggest:
[m]ost CLS scholars would probably agree that the first task is to understand the
political nature of the work of producing legal theory and doctrine, and to be self-
conscious about how one’s teaching and scholarship affects cultural definitions that
have political implications. (Trubek, n/d: 33)
CLS avoids the pitfalls of legal realism by rejecting the ability of law to reform and improve
American society. CLS does not attempt to draw common law or natural human rights
back into the law. Instead, CLS argues that law’s language and institutions taint any claim
made within them and produce results that will only serve to bolster law 's control over the
rest of society.
To expose law’s hegemony, CLS “talks about basics” (Kairys, 1982: 3), i.e. the
principles at work within legal discourse. One fundamental building block is the concept
of rights. CLS rejects liberal ideology and offers what conservative legal scholars have
called a “nihilistic” interpretation of the law. Two major tenets distinguish CLS’s critique
of liberal law: [1] liberalism takes for granted dichotomous pairs that, among other things,
separate the world into the public and private; [2] Liberal, legal discourse is inhibited by a
hyper-individualistic imperative. These concepts have significance for the construction of
“rights discourse”:
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Rights claims only perpetuate these dichotomies, limiting legal thinking and
inhibiting necessary social change.
. .Because rights “belong” to individuals-rights
rhetoric portrays individuals as “separate owners of their respective bundles of
rights”.
. .-they are necessarily individualistic. (Schneider, 1991: 302)
By privileging individual concerns, rights seldom effect broad-based group interests.
Further, by privileging public concerns, Schneider argues, rights often ignore the “private”
issues associated with women’s lives. In addition to these important criticisms, CLS
offers a critique stemming from liberalism’s construction of rights: “Legal strategies based
on rights discourse tend to weaken the power of a popular movement by allowing the state
to define the movement’s goals” (Schneider, 1991: 302). It is around this critique of
rights discourse that CLS makes its argument for a political disengagement with law. It is
with this proscription that CLS’s critics have taken issue.
The ability of CLS to wholly reject even the most progressive legal measures
should and has begged the question of how important such measures have been for CLS
scholars themselves. That is, CLS’s call to abandon of rights language can be connected to
their relative comfort as predominantly white, male scholars in mainstream, elite law
schools. Some have even suggested that CLS’s apparent nihilism is simply another
example of the nothing-if-not-mythical rejection of the father by the prodigal son. In other
words, CLS theory might be seen as nothing more than new patriarchal theory emerging
from the old. The whole-scale rejection vs. whole-scale justification of the law falls into
the same black/white dichotomy of traditional jurisprudence while failing to account for the
gray areas in law and society when monied, male, and white interests do not win the day.
Even while attempting to deconstruct dichotomies such as public vs. private, CLS has been
tempted into the binary logic of traditional jurisprudence. Like Hart’s retrieval of positivist
law from morality, CLS has attempted to retrieve progressive politics from law. While
supporting the basic skepticism toward traditional legal scholarship, both critical race and
feminist legal theorists have criticized CLS along these lines.
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3. critical race and feminist theory: identity and differenpp
The introduction of identity as political and legal difference was a response to both
traditional claims of legal neutrality and the wholescale rejection of rights language by the
predominantly white, male, elite left. Critical race and feminist theorists pointed to a gray
area between an assimilated and representative law and a law-less, de-centered existence.
Many scholars suggested that CLS did not truly comprehend the political and social status
(civil rights legislation, rape statutes, battery and property law) one would be giving up
should one reject law completely. Because the identities of CLS and traditional scholars
happened to be so similar and because each lacked the “penumbra” women and minorities
in the law had seen, many suggested a gray area in which the law functioned in politically
viable ways. Perhaps legal victories for civil rights had been symbolic, but symbolic
victories were productive of further grassroots activities and of a psychological change that
CLS failed to recognize. Leftist scholars who challenged the CLS position suggested that
their own identities as non-white, non-elite, and not-necessarily male played a role in their
different view of law. Because of their reliance upon different perspectives and experience,
critical race and feminist legal theory have been collected under the label of identity politics.
While CLS, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory each attempt to criticize the
“myth” of formal law, identity-based legal theory is open to critique from both traditional
jurisprudence and critical legal studies. What is identity politics and does identity-centered
jurisprudence replace the myth of neutrality with a mythology of difference?
Political theorist Kathy Ferguson has some difficulty pinpointing the exact meaning
of the often-used term, identity politics:
Identity politics is itself a slippery term. . .it claims that women-of-color, or third-
world women, or working-class women, or lesbians, because of the structure of
circumstances and activities they are likely to share, gravitate toward a shared
consciousness about themselves and their society. . .it posits some kernel of self-
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hood that adheres in those marked by color, class, passion, or world and can be
elicited when the veil of colonization is lifted. (1993: 1 19)
Identity politics, whether tied to a biological or a socially constructed definition of identity,
argues that one’s experiences as a member of a disenfranchized group leads to certain
political interests and goals. Law professor and narrative scholar Robin West relies upon
the tenets of identity politics in her work. She writes:
Women’s subjective, hedonic lives are different from men’s. The quality of our
suffering is different from that of men’s, as is the nature of our joy. Furthermore,
and of more direct concern to feminist lawyers, the quantity of pain and pleasure
enjoyed or suffered by the two genders is different: women suffer more than men.
(1993: 179)
Taking this political and “natural” fact as given, personal legal narratives might be rendered
a treatise on how identity creates a unique relationship with law. In her foreword to the
Michigan Law Review’s symposium on legal story-telling, Kim Lane Scheppele suggests
that legal scholarship (all legal scholarship) posits an implicit “we” to which the law is
responsible. She argues that whether the stories about the law are believed or not depends
upon who tells them:
All of these Articles attest to the very real presence of perceptual fault lines,
different descriptions of events that grow from different experiences and different
resonances. And most of these perceptual fault lines described in these Articles
occur at the boundaries between social groups, between whites and people of color,
between the privileged and the poor, between men and women, between lawyers
and nonlawyers. . .(1989: 2083)
The value of legal storytelling has been placed by commentators and storytellers alike in the
identity of the storyteller as a “member” of an “outgroup.” Like James Boyd White’s
hopes for a more literary law, Richard Delgado suggests that storytelling enhances both the
teller and the listener. Stories necessarily have an enlightening impact. Delgado writes.
Oppressed groups have always known instinctively that stories are an essential tool
to their own survival and liberation. Members of outgroups can use stories in two
basic ways- first, as a means of psychic self-preservation; and second, as means
of
lessening their own subordination. . .The storyteller gains psychically, the
listener
morally and epistemologically. (1989: 2437)
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Delgado also suggests that oppressed groups have an inherent motivation to share stories.
For “slaves, Mexican-American, Native American,” the oral tradition and the stories it
spawned have had liberatory, psychological, and cultural import. Consequently, when
members of these historically disenfranchised groups enter tradition-laden, white, male
law, story-telling naturally becomes a method of self-expression and of self-preservation.
The politics of identity lead to a humanist vision in which narratives—personal and fictional-
-introduce readers to new and often ignored participants in the legal game. According to
Delgado, many narratives function as “counter-stories” correcting false notions about
outsider groups fostered by a homogeneous (and eurocentric, male) insider scholarship. In
essence, Delgado writes, “Stories humanize us” (1989: 2440).
Critical race theory originated in the early eighties not so much as a coherent set of
theoretical propositions, but as a group of law students and teachers of color who sought
greater representation and recognition of difference in legal education. When Derrick Bell,
Harvard’s first African American law professor, left Harvard University, the school was
left with no one to teach his “Race, Racism, and American Law” course. Students,
including Mari Matsuda and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, first organized to have the
course taught by another African American scholar, but having Harvard fail to do that,
committed to teach an alternative course themselves with visiting scholars like Professors
Richard Delgado and Charles Lawrence. Summarizing the development of critical race
theory as a movement, these scholars write:
The group identity grew out of shared values and politics as well as the shared
personal experience of our search for a place to do our work, for an intellectual and
political community we could call home. Our identity as a group was also formed
around shared themes, methodologies, and voices that were emerging in our work.
(1993, 5)
Critical race theory emerged in opposition not only to the conservative and “Rule of Law”
perspective of elite law schools and the Reagan-era judiciary, but to the racism and
exclusion scholars of color faced within left movements-including critical legal studies.
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Critical race theorists utilize contextualized analysis and the experience of
disenfranchisement to inform their jurisprudence:
Critical race theory insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of
color and our communities of origin in analyzing law and society. This knowledge
is gained from critical reflection on the lived experience of racism and from critical
reflection upon active political practice toward the elimination of racism. (Matsuda
et al., 1993: 6)
The emphasis upon “raced” experience has been a source of controversy for critical race
scholars both inside and outside the African American legal community. In the era of
Constitutionally protected cross-burning (see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 1992), the efforts to
expose hate speech as more hatred-filled then speech-protected has focused critical race
scholars upon issues surrounding the first amendment and racist speech. In her highly
influential “Public Response to Racist Speech” (1987), Matsuda argues that the “stories of
those who have experienced racism are of special value in defeating racism” (1987: 50).
In determining what speech constitutes a violent act, people of color (who have experienced
that violence first hand) should have legal standing greater than that of white judges or
Supreme Court Justices. Matsuda resists the traditional civil libertarian rhetoric and argues
that “free speech” is a misnomer disguising the prevalence and acceptance of racist hate
speech in our society and in our legal system.
Nevertheless, critical race scholars could not presume to speak for the entire African
American legal community. Harvard’s conservative African American law professor
Randall Kennedy criticized critical race scholars for their overly determined idea of racial
consciousness and argued that it was both anti-intellectual and politically unproductive
(1995: 175-177). Critical race scholars have been criticized for relying upon an “identity
politics” that collapses under the weight of disparate opinions within a group identity.
Nevertheless, critical race scholars remain emersed in contests over experience and the
implications of a legal system that has the lacked and often ignored African American and
Latino perspectives.
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Women’s achievement of voting and reproductive rights have occurred in the last
seventy-five years and, like civil rights activism in certain ways, feminists found the allure
of rights new and empowering. Modem legal gains have legitimated this century’s
women’s movement and have “[come] to symbolize women’s responsibility to a world
beyond the home, and the possibility of their moving into the public realm” (Shanley,
1987: 9). Yet, this shift in responsibility still maintains the stark distinction between
public and private. Critics argue that distinctions like public and private are produced and
reproduced in even the most progressive legal causes. Social scientists and Critical Legal
Scholars attempt to illustrate the inability of litigation to bring about broad change in the
material conditions of women. With rights’ utility and limits in mind, feminist legal
scholars have all been influenced by either the law’s implicit call to liberalism and
sameness with men or critical legal studies’ absolute rejection of that call.
Many feminist legal scholars move beyond Tushnet’s treatment of rights by at once
understanding the limits of rights for women and responding to the historical, symbolic
power of rights as raisers of consciousness. Feminist legal scholars, like feminists in
general, differ and disagree along philosophical lines. Carrie Menkel-Meadow (1989)
describes a chronological development in feminist theories:
In what could be called three stages of feminist theory we have moved from
“sameness” or traditional equality arguments. . .to “difference” claims. . .to the
current strain of poststructuralist, postmodern diversity theorists who resist
essentialism and overgeneralizing that occur when two genders are opposed to each
other. (Menkel-Meadow, 1989: 296)
Feminist legal theory, however, has maintained one over-riding principle. As Patricia
Smith (1993) writes in her introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, feminism informs
critiques of law with one particular goal: “the one thing that unites all teminist theories and
distinguishes them from all other theories is the rejection of patriarchy” (Smith, 1993: 9).
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Feminist legal scholarship-also called resistant discourse (Smart, 1989); feminist
jurisprudence (Smith, 1992), outsider jurisprudence (Williams, 1991), and jurisprudence
unmodified (West, 1988)~struggles to create a legal system representative and appreciative
of women’s often disparate experiences. Like the Legal Realists before them, feminist
theory points out the divergence between what society expects from its legal institutions
and what it receives:
[Feminist] theories see law as a tool of patriarchy. This body of work exposes not
only how women are the victims of discrimination, but how notions of equality and
discrimination contain within them a male norm or comparator. (Kenney, 1992: 2)
As a tool of patriarchy, the legal system follows the same sexist hierarchy premised upon
asymmetrical, binary opposites of individual/community, rational/emotional, public/private,
man/woman. As one might expect, the law does not address women’s experience--
experience that has been dismissed as private (extra-legal), as emotional (not lawyer-talk),
as marginal (silent). As Catharine MacKinnon writes, these problems are systemic, i.e. a
product of a system premised upon male dominance (see MacKinnon, 1989).
The “myth of law” clouds any conception of law and maintains its image as
objective, universal, and totalizing. Legal scholar Carol Smart (1989) describes this
phenomenon:
It is important to acknowledge that the usage of the term ‘law’ operates as a claim to
power in that it embodies a claim to a superior and unified field of knowledge
which concedes little to other competing discourses which by comparison fail to
promote such a unified appearance. (Smart, 1989: 4)
Smart suggests that the law affects how rape victims describe their experience. The law’s
definitions become more powerful than an experience that might contradict or complicate
them. The outcomes of rape trials, therefore, follow patterns of “binary logic” in which
experience must be set up in the opposing guilt or innocence model. Smart writes, “This
may be entirely acceptable except that in rape cases guilt and innocence are dependent on
the outcome of another pair of opposites-this is consent/non-consent” (Smart, 1989: 33).
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Feminist legal theory has been prolific in its attention to the conceptual crisis related
to what is often seen as identity politics. Postmodern feminism attempts to deconstruct
gendered dualisms and to move beyond the sameness/difference debate. Judith Greenberg,
in her introduction to Mary Joe Frug’s Postmodern Legal Feminism, offers a description of
postmodernism and its relationship to liberalism and feminism. She writes.
Postmodern thought is a response to modem theories like liberalism, Marxism, and
the feminist dominance model. These seek to rationalize the social world, often
using all-encompassing pairs such as public and private, freedom and coercion,
capital and labor, and male and female. While such theories. . .claim to “be about
what is," and to describe reality, postmodern work is about interpretation. In a
reversal of the “modem,” postmodern theory focuses on the text instead of on the
events that are signified. Interpretation requires a position from which the event is
understood. . .The binary pairs of modem theory present particular and partial
perspectives. (Greenberg, 1992: xix)
Postmodernism and feminist legal theory are linked as much by a common enemy (liberal
humanism) as by common goals. The sibling rivalry between the two may be summed up
by the different tones created in each. According to Linda Singer, these are for
postmodernism, irony and for feminism, outrage. Singer explains:
Not that feminist discourse can claim to be immune from the effects of this game
playing, and its sociosymbolic imaginary. But because so much of that imaginary
has produced discernible effects, of the kind that, on many occasions, merits
outrage, judgment, indignation—just the kind of tone and frame that postmodern
cool works so hard to avoid. (Singer, 1992: 469)
Though Singer does not cite outrage and irony as mutually exclusive strategies, she does
argue that the “and” between a feminist and postmodern strategy maintains an
understanding of differences-notwithstanding the intertextual relationship-between the
two ventures. Joan C. Williams (1991) offers a postmodern, feminist reading of the
sameness/difference debate within feminism and critical race scholarship. The idea of
“sameness” so endearing to first wave and liberal feminism has given way to the concept of
difference.
Cultural or radical feminism suggests that while men view the world from a linear,
autonomous perspective, women view the world with a webbed, connected
consciousness.
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Robin West has been a central voice of “difference” in feminist legal theory’s identity
politics. According to West, women think relationally and non-hierarchically (West,
1989). Like Carol Gilligan, West calls upon women to create resistant discourses. In a
patriarchal society. West argues, women’s identities and experiences have been not only
devalued but negated. West (1989) describes the negation of women’s “selves” as a
construction of and inherent limit to liberal rights ideology. The “separation thesis” that
predates liberalism and law by separating individuals into singular, “unitary” beings with
individual “natural rights” does not include women. Instead, women are and have always
been connected to others through responsibility and biology. The potential to give birth
and the care for a weaker life that results from birth are fundamental experiences for
women. Unlike the un-gendered individuals of classical liberal thought, women do not
strive for nor can we ever achieve complete separation from others-stronger, weaker,
equal, or other-wise. From this philosophical difference
,
West claims liberalism—thus,
law—to be gendered male. According to West, theories based wholly in this notion of
separation and individuality,
[are] essentially and irretrievably masculine. . .Women are not essentially,
necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human




West bases much of her “connected” thesis to women’s potential for pregnancy-from
heterosexual intercourse to breast feeding-an undeniably narrow conception of women’s
identity. Nevertheless, she writes,
If, by “human beings” legal theorists mean women as well as men, then the
“separation thesis” is clearly false. If, alternatively, by “human beings” they mean
those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are not human beings.
It’s not hard to guess which is meant. (West, 1989: 2)
Critical legal scholars have taken for granted the autonomous, liberal “I” as a separate
masculine agent in search of community. Because of its centralization of male experience,
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West remains skeptical of any jurisprudence, (liberal, feminist, or other-wise). West
asserts that the law is unable to recognize women’s “essential experience.”
A critique of identity politics is implicit in the literature that celebrates it. Joan
Williams argues that feminist essentialist theory serves only to reinforce the “status quo” by
substantiating the oppositional relationship between men and women. Williams redefines
the concepts of “sameness” and “difference” in a way that deconstructs, and thus
supplements, the parameters of the current argument:
A postmodern approach also offers a reformulation of difference that avoids
essentialism by focusing on the multiple viewpoints available to any one individual.
Postmodernism offers a description of difference in which the notion of a stable set
of “essential” differences between men and women, European- and African-
American-or, indeed, between any two groups-disappears. (J. Williams, 1991:
299)
Williams rejects the divisiveness of loyalty to “one” static, guiding, and overwhelming
identity. In doing so, she seeks the catalysts that move certain identities to the foreground.
Her argument connects power and knowledge and illustrates the way characteristics have
been manipulated into “merit” because of their possessors’ relative power. The
sameness/difference debate have festered in critical race and feminist legal theories with
obvious repercussions. Even if one values the ability of identity-based theory to enlighten
narrow, often segregated, images of law and lawyering, counter-stories are hardly limited
to the perceptions of whites vs. those of people of color. Rather, counter-stories exist just
as strongly within “identity” groups as the perceptions of Stephen Carter in Reflections of
an Affirmative Action Babv( 1991) confirm. The writings ot Randall Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas, and Suzanna Sherry suggest that even within academic and professional circles,
the “call to stories” has been heard differently different even among people with a raced or
gendered identity. The impossibility of personal narrative’s insuring not only truthful and
accurate accounts of experience, but a singular representativeness of all African-
American’s, lesbians, women’s, etc., experience leads to another quandary within the legal
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academy. Personal legal narratives have not only been criticized according to the
weaknesses of identity politics, but according to the demands of a formalist and neutral
jurisprudence. Critics have demanded a provable and simplistic brand of personal
narratives if they are to be “taken seriously” by the legal community. Farber and Sherry
(1993) argue, “[A] valid exercise in storytelling must involve efforts to assure truthfulness
and typicality of the story. Because these attributes are not self-documenting, the author
must present some analysis to show that the story is credible and representative” (Farber
and Sherry, 1993: 853). Such criticisms engender another more legalistic reading of
personal narratives in the law: the normative or ‘how-the-law-should-respond-to-my-
experience’ reading.
The readings of personal legal narratives have followed, as this chapter might have
suggested, two perceptible paths with, oddly enough, similar results. Leftist scholars—
even when committed to the authors’ goals-question the efficacy of a genre based upon
identity politics. While traditional scholars search for the normative value of legal story-
telling and, having found none, relegate personal narratives to an non-legal field. The next
section will review the reviews of personal legal narratives within the legal academy. As
this paper hopes to argue, both the acceptances and rejections of legal narratives as legal
theory has a lot to do with the temptations of jurisprudence-that is, with the expectations of
the legal academy about what legal theory is or should be.
D. Temptations in Reading: Interpreting Narrative
According to law professor Richard Matasar, “The very purpose of legal
scholarship is to take a position-one shaped by unique, personal concems-and vigorously
argue its merits” (1992: 353). In supporting the role personal narratives have begun to play
in legal scholarship, Matasar is, if not alone, definitely in the minority when he suggests
that narratives make legal scholarship “more interesting, relevant, and valuable to students
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of the law (1992: 35). The legal academy has offered less glorifying descriptions of
outsider and narrative scholarship. Judge Harry T. Edwards has accused anti-formalist
scholars of “use[ing] the law school as a bully pulpit from which to pour scorn upon the
legal profession” (1992: 34). Not willing to go as far as Judge Edwards, Richard Posner
has nevertheless written articles about narrative scholarship with telling titles like: “The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987” (1987) and “The
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship” (1993). In the latter, Posner
offers the a self-evident aside concerning postmodern legal scholarship :
Then there is a wild literature that I have avoided mentioning in which law
professors in immensely long articles subject legal texts to the hermeneutic
techniques of postmodernist literary theory. No judge could get anything out of
that literature, and this unbridgeable gap is not merely a generational one. (1991:
1928)
Despite these authors disdain for the narrative and other anti-formalist theory, the real
indication of narrative scholarship’s impact upon the academy might be, as Stanley Fish
argues about feminist jurisprudence, the fact that so much has been written about it-both
positive and negative. As Fish writes,
It is not the force of feminist theory or even of supposedly theoretical slogans. .
.that has made such an impression on everyone, but the impossibility of avoiding
feminist ways of thinking even when you reject them. Indeed, rejecting them is in
some sense what one cannot do: the man who refuses to substitute “he or she” for
“he” and believes that in doing so he is remaining true to his prefeminist self, is
self-deluding; for the fact that he feels obliged to refuse marks his act as different
from the one he used to perform when he wrote “he” without any awareness that it
was a choice. Feminism “has” him. . . (1989: 24)
If Fish is to be believed, articles like Edwards’ and Posner’s and the dedication of several
issues of prominent law journals 11 to either the problem or the panacea of legal storytelling
should attest to a theoretical shift in the legal community. To locate just what this shift has
meant for readings of legal narrative, this section reviews several of the more influential
1989.
n See especially, Texas Law Review , Vol. 60, 1982 and Michigan Law Review, Vol. 87,
August
articles surrounding the uses of legal narrative. The temptation toward either identity
politics or a scientific jurisprudence define the parameters of that criticism.
Law professor Kathryn Abrams has written extensively on the topic of legal
narrative, particularly feminist narratives. In her earlier work, “Hearing the Call of Stories”
(1991), Abrams articulates and affirms a need for narratives to contain normative claims.
While her more recent writing retreats from this position, her argument as well as that of
Farber and Sherry help to define the normative critique of narratives. Abrams suggests that
Marie Ashe’s narrative about childbirth avoids easy generalization and categorization by
speaking to the different ways women deal with life and death. From this unfurling of
different experiences, however, Abrams is not sure what to do next. Her criticism follows
from a critique of identity politics asserted above. In retreating from identity politics,
Abrams turns toward more traditional questions:
I find myself wondering, somewhat uncharacteristically, about the “typicality” of
the views Ashe expresses. Ashe’s narratives. . .ask the reader to credit the
narrator(s)’ rendition of a particularized experience. . .While I believe Ashe’s
narrative genuinely reflect her own experience of birth, I wonder whether she
speaks for all women. I particularly doubt that she speaks for me. . .This concern,
not atypically I suspect, crystallizes as a questions about “normative legal content.”
. . .How, for Ashe, do these physical narratives about birth and death translate into
ideas for legal change? (1991:1009)
Abrams is quick to clarify her critique of Ashe and other narratives by realizing that
narratives emerge from a context of legal skepticism which attempts to invigorate the law
with outsider’s voices. She wants to avoid characterizing the experiences described in
personal narratives as “unitary or uncontested” or as so specialized that “they can not be
made intelligible to members of other groups” (1991: 1018). This said, Abrams argues that
for narratives to be useful to the broader world of legal scholarship, a normative and
explanatory level must be included in them:
Drawing out of a story elements that are shared, general, or capable of repetition is
a crucial part of relating, or understanding that story: it sketches the network of
connections, obligations, and relationships from which the particular features of the
story take their meaning. . .Normative elaboration not only facilitates connection ot
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a narrative with an author’s substantive legal arguments (a move that may make the
narrative accessible to a wider variety of readers), it facilitates conversation with
scholars from diverse methodological background. (1991: 1047)
Abrams argues that a normative component to narrative might strengthen its position within
the legal community, but does not argue that this normative component is the only way in
which narratives might be effective. More critical of the genre and more supportive of the
normative role legal scholarship plays in the law, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry use
aspects of Abrams argument to assert the role narratives should play in legal theory.
Farber and Sherry attempt “to take legal storytelling seriously” (1993: 854). The
authors find that narratives have an important role to play in the legal academy, but question
the legal value of personal narratives that do not commit to an analysis and normative
conclusion about their experiences. While Farber and Sherry repeat Abrams’ concerns
with narrative’s ability to represent group experience, they are more concerned with
verifying and making accountable the story-tellers. Farber and Sherry argue that
narratives, like any other form of scholarship, must be subject to rigorous tests of
objectivity, typicality, and quality
:
Although most of this debate concerns the distinctive nature and purposes of legal
scholarship, our concern here is with the more basic question of what qualifies as
good scholarship in general, in any academic discipline. Most academics would
agree that traditional standards of merit do exist. And most would concede that the
standards can often be applied unevenly or too leniently. We are not suggesting
that all extant scholarship does meet the standards we propose, only that it aspires
to. Different voice theorists argue, however, that those traditional standards
operate unfairly. . .against storytelling. . . (1993: 840)
The authors suggest that an analytical component is and should be required by the
standards of “good scholarship”-traditional or otherwise. By defining the terms of their
“test for good scholarship,” the authors make the point that such analytical work is not
inherently white or male or anti-storytelling. Without equating their “identities” with the
inability to do analytical work, the claims-according to Farber and Sherry-that traditional
legal scholarship marginalizes the scholarship of women, minorities, and those who
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attempt to alter traditional forms of legal theory are not valid. That done, Farber and Sherry
argue for more responsible and more discipline-specific narratives: “Just because
something is worthwhile does not mean that it should take place under a law school
umbrella. Indeed, to the extent that fictional or fictionalized accounts purport to be
scholarship, they jeopardize the credibility of legal scholarship” (1993: 845).
Legal scholarship, then, is a distinct and somewhat static vocation with several hard
and fast rules. Farber and Sherry propose the following characteristics of legal
scholarship:
[Ojur aim is to identify the core goals of legal scholarship. Toward that end, we
propose to divide the traditional standards of scholarship into three categories: (1)
consensus standards. . .(2)reason and analysis. . .(3)methods of evaluating the
importance of a work. . .Almost everyone would agree that a work of scholarship
should be comprehensible to its audience, say something new, and demonstrate
familiarity with the relevant literature. Despite their vagueness, these standards can
still help expose some stories as not very good scholarship. (1993: 847)
Under these qualifications, Farber and Sherry deny Ashe’s “Zig-Zag Stitching” the label of
good scholarship. They argue that scholarship should be an “interactive” experience and
should allow the reader “to enter the dialogue” (1993: 851). Anecdotal evidence and
fictional hypothesizing may have a place in literature, but the rigors of academic scholarship
demand that facts be open to verification and ideas be positioned to affect and even alter the
landscape of the discipline. The “importance” of scholarship is measured by its ability to
change that landscape (and, one imagines, change it for the better). Farber and Sherry
celebrate the analytical component of quality scholarship. Scholarship without this
requisite normative goal, the authors argue, “is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings
of Fact’ but no ‘Conclusions of Law’” (1993: 854). Law professor Toni Massaro repeats a
similar criticism of narrative scholarship, or what she calls empathy literature. She argues
that the law itself can not be inherendy labelled un-empathetic, but that the law—by virtue of
the breakdown in human communication that brings the law into our lives in the first place-
-has to choose one picture of reality over another: “Where consensus ends, lines are
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drawn, and those outside the line—legal losers—always will feel unheard and wounded”
(1989. 2122). Massaro, like Farber and Sherry, argues that legal narratives lack the
normative quality that would make them useful to legal theory. She writes:
The guideposts for assigning our priorities are missing in the empathy literature.
Indeed, they are missing from much contemporary American legal scholarship,
perhaps because of the influence of the deconstruction school of literary criticism or
perhaps because guideposts of this sort are too difficult to establish or defend. The
problem of priorities, however, has not disappeared. On the contrary, in our
complex world of shrinking resources the problem of priorities will only grow
more fierce. We therefore can not outrun the practical-moral task of distinguishing
the possibilities of good from the possibilities of evil. (1989: 2126)
Massaro’ s desire for uncomplicated guideposts and priorities does not attend to the
possibility that those guideposts and priorities may have also become complicated “in our
complex world.” The normative critique of narrative scholarship is itself criticized in a later
article by Kathryn Abrams.
In “Unity, Narrative, and the Law” (1993), Abrams can be read to reject Massaro’s
and Farber and Sherry’s appeals for a normative jurisprudence. Instead, Abrams argues
that it is the unified, normative narratives that are the least effective and the least politically
viable. Unified narratives, according to Abrams’ definition, are an unambiguous attempt to
“mak[e] women primary in accounts of social experience; at granting them the status of
subject that they have so often been denied in more traditional historical accounts or social
descriptions. . .[and] to reveal oppressive aspects of women’s experience” (1993: 17).
The key word in this description and in Abrams’ argument is unambiguous. She argues
that these unambiguous narratives— like the ones called for by Massaro and Farber and
Sherry-lead to the question of representativeness. That is, they walk head first into the
theoretical and practical issues surrounding identity politics, some of which were
mentioned above. Abrams, again unlike Massaro and Farber and Sherry, is not willing to
reject what she calls “experiential” narratives. Instead, she calls into question the
possibility of objectivity and the insistence upon normative claims following from
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representative, provable, and objective experience. Unitary narratives do not challenge
these “standards” in legal theory as they claim to, but rather, “replace it with a form that is
differently derived (1993: 22). According to Abrams, “complex narratives” are more
successful at disrupting and challenging the subtle presuppositions of legal theory.
Complex narratives,
contest the notion of a reality as an external, measurable state of affairs: what is
“out there”-be it a group of people, a type of experience or a discriminatory
attitude-is not seen as consistent or constant even by a single narrator. Moreover,
the narrator’s role in constructing the “reality” presented is made visible in many
instances; the complications and choices implicit in this role are palpable and often
central to the telling.
. .complex narratives.
. .necessarily challenge the notion of
“truth” as correspondence to this state of affairs. .
.
(1993: 23)
Unlike narratives appealing to an identity politics, Abrams suggests that narrative theorists
like Patricia Williams who expose themselves to multiple interpretations and think of
themselves and their stories on multiple levels are examples of complex and more politically
useful narratives. As for the suggestion that such complicated narratives can not contain
normative value, Abrams argues that scholars looking for quick and wholly legal solutions
to social problems like those contained in anti-discrimination law are often failing to solve
the problem. That is, to date, legal doctrine has not ended race and gender discrimination.
Possibly a different approach to the problem would allow law to deal more effectively with
this complex social issue. Abrams writes:
When scholars believe that the initiation of these more difficult inquiries will take
them outside their accepted domains, and interfere with their ability to generate
readily usable solutions, they may not take seriously the multifaceted explorations
necessary to addressing gender discrimination. (1993: 25)
Abrams divides narratives into politically effective and ineffective categories according to
their ability to accept a multiple and ambiguous world view. The texts then gain political
and legal value according to their author’s explicit (or perhaps implicit) admission that
their’s is not the woman’s (or African American’s, or Asian American’s, etc.) perspective.
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This approach reverses the useful/wasteful dichotomy established by legal scholars
concerned with normative or “Conclusions of Law” value. The reversal makes the claim
that a set of narratives is still legally (and politically) un-useful, but it is a different set of
narratives for a different set of reasons. Abrams’ argument centers upon a similar value
distinction between politically useful and politically useless or potentially dangerous
narratives. The ability to divide narratives into these two groups, however, as well as the
ability to see an ambiguous and complex world view as something other than a chaotic
pouring of scorn upon the legal profession suggests a shift in the reader as much as the
text. Nevertheless, Abrams’ reading of narratives results from a particular set of
theoretical (and potentially political) practices not unlike in character (though opposite in
form) those of Farber and Sherry. That is, Abrams’ reading of personal narratives as
political relies upon the same identity vs. difference and law as political vs. law temptations
articulated throughout this chapter. In other words, Abrams reads personal narratives
according to the constraints of jurisprudence-constraints which demand that legal writing
replace one mythical or universal claim over another. In the next chapter, I attempt to read
Williams’ personal narratives as a genre of legal writing in which mythical temptations do
not only go unheeded, they are deconstructed. In this theoretical space, a textual politics





The fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news.
Jacques Derrida 12
A. Introduction
Whether centered upon legal distinctness, legal indifference, or the identity of legal
actors, myths invite an air of skepticism and attempts to replace that skepticism with a truer,
more powerful version of myth. The criticisms of personal legal narratives have emerged
from and have reified the mythical standards upon which jurisprudence has stood. It is my
argument that personal legal narratives can be read and written in a different way. The
personal legal narratives of this chapter are not free from the temptations of legal myth-
making. The context of justifying, critical, and identity-based jurisprudence is ever- present
in the personal narratives of Patricia Williams. Nevertheless, Williams’ choice of genre
effects a struggle to avoid making mythic claims about the origins of law or the right way to
change law. The irony of these narratives lies in the authors' use of mythic language and
figures even as she confronts and ultimately deconstructs the mythology of law. This
chapter connects deconstruction to the law and literature movement’s emphasis on reading
and the deconstructive writing in personal legal narratives, represented by Patricia




For all their compelling brilliance, their deep affinity for the local and civil plight of
queers, deconstructive and psychoanalytic approaches seem unsuccessful at
connecting their crucial “reading” technique with the modes of constitution of,
especially, civil-rights linked identity.
Cindy Patton 13
Discourses negotiate inclusion and exclusion by operating as what Donna Haraway
calls “modes of power” (1989: 289). This paper argues that deconstruction has allowed
modes of power, as they operate in texts, to be articulated. Unlike Fraser and Cornell’s
rejection or defense of deconstruction as a method for understanding women’s
subordination, the passage above questions the ability of deconstruction to explode that
subordination and open a space for different cultural narratives. The shift is one in effect—
from description to production, from an emphasis on why to an emphasis on how. With
this shift, texts become locations of politics which create a different space for
deconstructing identity/difference, law/politics. Cornell suggested that deconstruction
contains an ethical prerogative-a double interest in knowing and being known by the
Other. As such, deconstruction has, by definition, a methodological role in the discursive
practices of marginalized groups. Nevertheless, the concept of identity is conspicuously
absent from Cornell’s discursive play of allegory and metaphor. This is perhaps to avoid a
misreading of deconstructive politics as essentialist. Cindy Patton’s criticism of
deconstructive and psychoanalytic practices offers a more thoughtful and less polemic path
toward an intersection between deconstructive method and identity (factional) politics. She
suggests, “[Djeconstructionists may believe in the imputed essentialist identities much more
than those in the political sphere who are purported to have them” (1993: 166). That is, the
deconstruction of identities (the release of identity from ontology) may have already
13 1993: 166.
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occurred in the movement politics of a postmodern world. That identities rely upon
discursive practices and duties rather than some essentialist “being” underneath state-
imposed categories is an effect of what Patton calls “postmodern govemmentality.” This
lengthy but important passage compares the tasks and legitimacy of modem with that of
postmodern govemmentality:
If the modem state’s business was to legitimate its existence in the absence of
theological justification,
. . .then the postmodern state seems concerned to recede
from visibility, to operate blindly as a purely administrative apparatus to an apparent
market democracy. If the modem state had to describe its existence with reason, .
.
.the postmodern state has to pose itself as capable of administering an incoherent,
incommensurable plurality of interests. The modem state integrates social factions
to resolve conflict; the postmodern state holds pluralities apart. Instead of invoking
organicist logic that links the nation to the individual.
. .the postmodern state
proposes lateral linkages, . . .If modernity conceived power in blocks that operate
entropically, postmodern power circulates, disperses, intensifies. .
.
(1993: 172)
For deconstructive methods to be in line with the practices of resistance (textual and
otherwise), this conception of postmodern govemmentality is crucial. The state has
changed, Patton seems to be arguing. Consequently, the way we read and write must
change. Identity claims no longer connote a moral appeal to the state. Patton suggests that
by claiming an identity, one is engaging in a performance-not choosing a costume, but
performing the duties and desires that will discursively control that identity:
The crucial battle now for “minorities” and resistant subalterns is not achieving
democratic representation but wresting control over the discourses concerning
identity construction. The opponent is not the state as much as it is the other
collectivities attempting to set the rules for identity construction in something like a
“civil society.” . . .The discursive practices of identity and the actors who activate
them produce the categories of govemmentality that engender the administrative
state apparatus, not vice versa. (1993: 173)
Politics, then, is taking place in the “readings” and “misreadings” of identity as it takes
place in New Right pamphlets, in the writing of laws by legislative aids, in the “threshold”
between “social and political institutions.” Cornell’s ethical deconstruction under-identities
(rather than over-identifies, as Fraser argued) the collectivities at struggle within
discourses. Such abstractness errs in the “right” direction, but errs nonetheless. Cornell is
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so concerned with correcting the misunderstandings of deconstruction, she tends to
valorize the “otherness” inherent in a deconstructive reading while offering no method for
combatting the ways marginalized groups, as Patton suggests, are “being read off in larger
fields of power” (1993: 174). That is, deconstruction offers a method for reading the
discursive field, a field through which power (and politics) operates, but Cornell’s ethical
deconstruction does not address the ways in which postmodern identities (at work in a
discursive field) might engage in reading/writing/power struggles. This is not a simple
“too much theory/not enough politics” criticism of deconstruction. Rather, I am suggesting,
with, I think, Patton, that deconstruction has already re-defined political practices and
presuppositions to the extent that politics can occur in different, sometimes discursive,
locations. In a deconstructive discourse, both identity and the other mean something
“new.”
Chapter three detailed the temptations of jurisprudence in order to show the closed
shop in which legal theorizing has occurred. Legal theory has toiled under disciplinary
constraints that has led even anti-formalist jurisprudence to create a mythical center or claim
to truth. In staging critical theory with these conventions of legal discourse, criticisms
remained vulnerable to the interpretive conventions of the legal community. This is not to
argue that critical theory in legal discourse has not altered the way law works and the ways
law represents women and minorities. This is to say, only, that the modes of power at
work within even the most critical or nihilistic legal theory has not challenged the “style” of
jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has not heeded the call for, to paraphrase Derrida, a style of
writing that can be many things at once, that uses the discourses available and attempts to
step temporarily outside each of them at different times. This “monster theory is the
change in style that Derrida believes will create new inteipretive communities-that is, will
create new legal readers. And, new legal readers are both constituted by and constitutive of
a different jurisprudence and a different conception of and contests over power. As Patton
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suggests, postmodern govemmentality places political importance in the discursive
strategies chosen (or created as choices) by writers, speakers, actors. Identities are written
or activated by words and genres. While arguing that texts activate identities may not be an
especially cogent point, when deconstruction becomes a way of reading and writing these
textualized identities, one is able to move away from the unsatisfying choices of either
essentialist group politics or stark individualism. Deconstruction allows for a more
interesting method of treating those identities. By placing the center in question,
deconstruction allows these textualized identities to mean more than one thing, to alter over
time, to perform momentarily as a politically useful idea without buying into staid and
overly determined political identity. The politics of identity may be re-read (again and
again).
How, then, do we read a genre of “monster theory” that combines auto-biography
and fiction, dominant discourses and subaltern discourses, the master’s tools with the
de(con)struction of the master’s house? —for instance, Patricia Williams’ personal
narratives. 14 An examination of the “house” from which personal legal narratives emerge
and disrupt was the purpose of chapter three. Again, my focus on legal texts and legal
theory as one context does not preclude other contexts, readings, or approaches. Further,
every reading signifies a system of interpretation for which the reader must be responsible.
Obviously, my reading of deconstruction as political engagement opposes Fraser’s reading
of deconstruction. However, my understanding of deconstruction carries a political
mandate Fraser disregards and Cornell celebrates. Deconstruction as an ethical pursuit
demands that I have more invested in my reading of Williams (or any text) than my position
in what Fraser calls, a “transcendental safe house” (1989: 91). As Cornell rightly
suggests: “Interpretation is not simply the individual or for that matter the community.
14Other texts in this “genre” might include Henry Louis Gates’ Cobred People (1994) and
Dorothy Allison’s Skin (1994).
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playing with itself (1992b: 81). The law and literature movement places these questions
of reading and interpretation in fore.
C. Different Readings
But the law can more properly be seen not as a set of rules or commands, even with
a set of restatable principles or values behind them, but as the culture of argument
and interpretation through the operations of which the rules acquire their life and
ultimate meaning. James Boyd White
^
The law and literature movement has importance for the reading of personal
narratives, in part because of the involvement of narrative scholars like Patricia Williams
and in part because of its focus upon reading and interpretation as contestable and
constrained practices. Law has always relied upon narrative devices whether in its more
pragmatic sense (the facts of the case tell a story about (il)legal activity) or in its more
theoretical sense (the law tells a story that helps to narrate our society’s vision of right and
wrong). Law and literature scholars argue that legal documents and doctrine is never only
about statutes and parties. The “law” always envelops and sits atop social values and
historically contextualized “truths.” Brown v. Board of Education is, of course, a narrative
about slowly changing racial prejudice and the evolving role of federal government in the
“local” realm of racist school systems and segregation. Nevertheless, law is not a closed
narrative with one accepted interpretation and one ultimate “truth.” In this sense, legal
narratives function much like literary narratives—the interpretation of both types of texts are
contested and altered by time, politics, and intellectual movement. The movement can be
divided into two branches. The law-m-literature branch, might explore the law used as a
iswhite, 1983: 436.
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plot device in classics such as Franz Kafka’s The Trial or Harper Lee’s To Kill A
Mockingbird. The second, law-as-literature branch:
uses a broader range of methods and theoretical practices of literary criticism as a
medium for analyzing legal texts and exploring the nature of legal style and rhetoric.
This strand of the movement developed from the idea that storytelling is relevant
for legal studies because, . . .law is but another story to be interpreted. (Minda,
1993: 150)
The law as literature movement, represented best by scholars James Boyd White and
Stanley Fish, explore the intersections between these two text-centered vocations. It is the
law-as-literature work that this chapter will incorporate into the legal academy’s more
specific treatment of personal legal narrative. It is within the context of the law-as-literature
movement and its impact upon traditional legal theory that personal legal narratives emerge
and are both influential and controversial.
The interpretation of law as literature has been particularly important to
constitutional scholars. Criticism as it is performed by literary critics and readers of
literature more broadly has been adopted as a method of legal analysis. The focus is shifted
from the crafter of legal doctrine (the judge or author
)
to the audience of that doctrine. The
readers and their response and interpretation of a text becomes as (and sometimes, more)
important than the “objective” words on the page or the author’s intentions. Stanley Fish
(1982) has argued that the interpretive community which surrounds a text actually and
continually “makes” a text’s meaning and text’s “place” within a broader canon. This is
not to say (as Fish has been accused of suggesting) that with every new reader, an
entirely
new text may be created. Fish writes:
Interpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and
not
possible to do, what is and what is not a reasonable thing to say, what will and
will
not be shared as evidence, in a given enterprise; and it is within
those same
constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the documents
to
whose interpretation they are committed. (1982: 562)
Legal interpreters, like the interpreters of literary texts, are bound by the
constraints of their
“enterprise.” This enterprise takes place within a context of
history and personal and
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political conflicts which influence the interpreter’s very understanding of what it is he or
she is doing. How is this different from Dworkin’s use of literary criticism to describe
judicial behavior? Dworkin suggests that judges are constrained by “the proposition of
law and must draw their interpretations from a body of knowledge. Fish argues that
Dworkin’s use of the “many authors/one text” metaphor to describe legal interpretation fails
to comprehend the constraints met and mediated by the “original” author. That is, Dworkin
argued that “every novelist but the first has the dual responsibilities of interpreting and
creating, because each must read all that has gone before in order to establish, in the
interpretivist sense, what the novel so far created is” (Dworkin, 1982: 541). On the
contrary, Fish responds,
. . .the first author has surrendered his freedom as soon as he commits himself to
writing a novel, for he makes his decision under the same constraints that rule the
decisions of his collaborators, He must decide, for example, how to begin the
novel, but the decision is not “free” because the very notion of “beginning a novel”
exists only in the context of a set of practices that at once enable and limit the act of
beginning. (1982: 553)
Fish asserts that Dworkin’s method relies upon a tension between the freedom of the
interpreter and the restrictiveness of the text. This tension leaves Dworkin with the same
theoretical problems he seeks to overcome-those of the legal realist vs. the legal positivist.
Fish writes:
[Dworkin] assumes that history in the form of a chain of decisions has, at some
level, the status of a brute fact; and he assumes that wayward or arbitrary behavior
in relation to that fact is an institutional possibility. Together these two assumptions
give him his project, . . .As a result, these alternatives rule his argument, at once
determining its form and emerging, again and again, as its content. (1982, 559)
Fish’s critique of Dworkin’s attempts at “literary/legal criticism” exposes the innovative
character of the law as literature movement. Applying literary criticism’s techniques are not
as theoretically simple as “reading” law as a novel or applying a literary sensibility to the
“scientific” practice of reading legal behavior. By taking Dworkin to task on his attempt to
draw the literary into law, Fish implicitly characterizes his own method of analysis as
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different from a positivist, realist, or-to be sure-any purely legal approach to the
intersections between law and literature. I will return to Fish as an outspoken critic of
transcendent or formal textual meaning later in this section. His approach to law and
literature offers a method of reading and interpreting radically opposed to the predominant
vision of the relationship between law and literature espoused by scholars such as
Dworkin, Richard Posner (1988, 1993), or even James Boyd White (1982).
James Boyd White has, in fact, characterized law and literature as “an art form”
(Minda, 1993: 164). A law professor and prolific contributor to law and literature
scholarship, White argues that neither literary nor legal texts (and the narratives they
contain) can be definitively “restated” or mined for ultimate meaning. This is not a simple
claim of artistic beauty or a sentimental claim about the inability of criticism to “capture” the
essence of a text. Rather, White argues that once something that is written is read, a
structural transformation in language occurs. Language itself becomes something different,
altered by the injection of this new form into a context that itself is constantly altered and
transformed:
This is what it means to hope that one’s text will have a life of its own. As for the
reader, he or she knows that over time words change their meaning and values
shift; that expectations as to form evolve. All of this is bound to have an effect on
the reading of the text. For example, in an age so atheistic, or at least so
determinedly pluralistic as today s. . .we may have difficulty in responding to
Burke s talk about religious toleration.
. .As our language changes, we acquire the





Whites s observations about the shifting of values and language are easily seen in the realm
of literary criticism. Without these shifts, a feminist analysis of Chaucer’s fourteenth-
century work The Canterbury Tales would be impossible-not just theoretically or
politically controversial, but absolutely impossible. The application of such analysis to law
and literature, though plausible because both practices are so text-driven, is less obvious in
readings of the law. How do the reader’s cultural and linguistic settings alter and expose
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texts to new readings? Is this argument akin to Fish’s which suggested that interpretive
communities determine texts’ meanings?
White argues, no. Texts can no more be proven to hold no inherent meaning (or, to
put it another way, just what a group of readers perceive its meaning to be) than they can
be proven to hold one objective meaning. 16 White argues that the question inherent in this
dichotomy (no meaning vs. one meaning) is a “false one”:
. . .the meaning of a text is not to be found in it like a stone and held up for display;
nor do I think that texts as such are inherently unintelligible. One can neither
disregard the independent force of the text, nor assume that all one’s questions are
unambiguously answered within it. . . .Despite their form, such questions do not
really state a choice, for neither alternative is possible to the exclusion of the other.
At best, they define a topic of inquiry and argument, a field of concern marked by a
tension between extremes. (1982: 418)
White suggests that the reading of literary texts can parallel the reading of legal texts in the
“experience it offers its reader” (1982: 420). The idealization of the reading experience
suggests certain implications for White’s reading of law as literature.
For White, readings by different readers can never achieve identity with one
another—nor can they arrive at one unanimous, objective interpretation. This said. White
furthers the point by arguing that the reader is changed by every reading of a text. In other
words, the reader and the text emerge as something new with every reading experience:
one is always learning to see more clearly what is there and to respond more fully
—
or at least differently-and in the process one is always changing in relation to text
or to friend. It is in this process of learning and changing that much of the meaning
of the text or of a friendship resides; the text is in fact partly about the ways in
which its reader will change in reading it. (1982: 429)
White centers this reader/text relationship around the concept of an “ideal reader. The
ideal reader is both the expectation of the author and the aspiration of the reader. White is
literal about this aspiration. He argues that a text can impose itself upon the reader in both
I6jhis is meant to contrast Fish’s concept of interpretive communities and their control over texts
meaning and value to a positivist vision of objective meaning or Dworkin's implicit
claim of an original
(but interpretable) truth.
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constructive and destructive ways. Some texts act in an “unfriendly” manner and allow the
reader a free reign” on his or her own “destructive impulses.” Other texts, those that
White would call “great,” allow the ideal reader to reach his or her highest potential:
This reading produces a sense of the text working on its reader, on oneself, that is
different from any way it could actually work in the real world on any person. .
.[Burke’s] ideal reader is. . .one who recognizes the claims of others, in
qualification of those very preferences, and can thus make a real claim to the virtues
of toleration and justice. And the ideal reader of this passage will not only acquire
this character in his reading of it, but will carry it into the rest of his life, as he
speaks the language he has learned here. (1982: 432)
The experience of reading—in White’s ideal lexicon—is an exceptional, extra-ordinary one
and one which can not necessarily occur during one’s first encounter with a text. There is a
temporal and incremental dimension to White’s idealism. It is from these dimensions that
the enlightenment influence becomes clear in White’s reader/text relationship. Texts teach
their readers not only to be better readers, not only to incur a new relationship with
language, but (in some cases) to become batter human beings. From Burke, readers learn
toleration and justice—not simply Burke’s treatment of the terms, but on an ontological
level, readers become more tolerant and just:
The reader’s engagement with such a text is always tentative. While responding to
the text he is always asking how he responds, who he is becoming, and checking
that against his other wishes and aspects. Sometimes he is fooled: the racist joke
may make him a momentary and chagrined racist. . . .Sometimes-and this is the
central point-he is educated. (1982: 432)
Both White and his “ideal reader” are obviously reading (and writing) within a humanist
framework. For White, the ideal reader is neither a passive receptor nor a neutral field
upon which the text acts. White acknowledges and appears to celebrate the reader’s debate
between the text and the “different cultural contexts”(1982: 433) in which the reader sits.
White is less clear on exactly what these contexts are and how they actually work on the
reading of a text. Exactly how does the reader’s cultural location in and of the antebellum
American South for instance affect the ideal reading of a “racist” text. The
“fooled/educated” dichotomy relies upon a vision of human enlightenment in which the
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chagrined racist is fooled and has only to read the right texts to learn to be anti-racist.
Moreover, White’s dichotomy is predicated upon the text rather than reader because, for
White, all readers are the same and have the same potential for edification. Even as he
rejects the “Great Books" approach as superficial. White maintains the theoretical
imperatives of that approach in his conception of an “ideal reader” and (the next logical
assumption) the existence of an “ideal text.”
The employment of the ideal reading, because of its ability to “defin[e] the
possibilities. . .of our lives,” is espoused by White. Because law is applied to and
constitutive of its own political and cultural contexts, the “ideal [legal] reader” must not
only immerse him or herself in the text of law, but must be immersed in a reading of culture
and politics as well. This is not identical to, say, a realist claim that judges and other legal
interpreters are subject to their social position, what they ate for breakfast, their own unique
political goals and aspirations. White’s claim is staked in the relationship between text and
interpreter (and then culture), rather than culture and interpreter (and then text). That is.
White argues, “the lawyer is engaged in a continuous argument the terms of which are
always changing, in an interaction between the particular document and its larger world.”
Notice White’s antecedent to the pronoun “its”: The document and its larger world-the
world of language. It is both language and legal texts that are irrevocably altered by each
reading. They become the location of “a conversational process” that eventually creates the
accepted interpretations of legal texts. White suggests: “The lawyer s work is thus
analogous to that experienced by the single reader of the literary text” (1982: 435). Still,
and always for White, the text is a separate and unified object-unitied if not in meaning, at
least in external existence, as an object. It is this external existence which allows White to
make a claim, again as opposed to Fish, for textual meaning outside communities of
readers. White writes: “Of course, our readings are in some sense communally
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determined; but they are readings of texts that are themselves external to the community,
not mere wish fulfillments” (1982: 438).
James Boyd White s reading, while critical of “found law,” creates an interesting
blend of identity/formalist practices. White argues that if the reader is ideal, his or her
identity will be transformed by the (one) meaning of the text. White has opened the door to
the possibility that social and political values are constructed and help to construct readings
of a text. He has, unfortunately, only offered a vague notion of how these constructions
work. The meaning of a text and the reasons for reading a legal text are placed within a
“rhetorical community” that through a “culture of argument” create and perpetuate our
understanding(s) of law. These arguments construct “a world and make it real” because
these conversations function not in the abstract worlds of “social policy and political
philosophy” but “from a defined position, to a defined audience, in a defined language”
(1982, 441). According to White, what makes these conversations “real” and “defined” is
their implicit mandate to the reader to answer the question: “who are you?” That is, law
demands of its reader a conscious humanity, a unified subjectivity through which the text
may act.
If White’s literary theory relied upon the text to humanize its reader. White’s legal-
literary theory offers the text a perfect (the ideal) subject upon which to work its magic. Of
course, the more each individual reader consciously begins to answer the question of who
he or she is, the more likely a “we” will emerge and with it will develop “a sharpened sense
of respect for the cultural inheritance which constitutes ‘us,’ and from which we learn”
(1982: 443). While White’s literary criticism offered the theory for an evolving human
race, law appears to be the practice through which this evolved human race accepts its
appropriate cultural inheritance. Though couched in the terms of a readerly (and
contestable?) relationship with texts, White’s “ideal reader” is, nevertheless, an overly
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determined, unified subject whose convergence with others as a “community of readers” is
more ephemeral and abstract than any literary creation.
Still, White s demonstration of a literary sensibility in determining the role of
political and cultural values in legal interpretation opens the door for different kinds of
literary readings. Stanley Fish offers a theory of text and meaning that recognizes
deconstruction as a productive interpretive practice. Fish, like White, focuses upon a
community of readers, but Fish argues that it is readers who determine textual meaning not
the other way around. Fish draws upon the linguistic theory of Derrida to argue that
readings are always contextualized:
The issue here is between two notions of context: traditionally a context has been
defined as a collection of features and therefore something that can be identified by
any clear-eyed observer; but Derrida thinks of a context as a structure of
assumptions, and it is only by those who hold those assumptions or are held by
them that the features in question can first be picked out and then identified as
belonging to context. . .contexts, while they are productive of interpretation, are
also the products of interpretation.
. .(1989: 53)
For Fish (and Derrida), there is no clear-eyed observer--no philosopher king-who stands
free from context or interpretation. Therefore, no text can be written, read, understood, or
analyzed outside of the constraints and assumptions of a context. This is just as true of the
interpretation of a “baseball game, of a classroom situation, of a family reunion, of a trip to
the grocery store, of a philosophical colloquium” (1989: 53), as it is of a text. These
events are “the same” on the level of convention-each occurs according to the conventions
of the system to which each activity belongs. This is not to say that these systems and their
conventions are static and unchallenged. On the contrary, each is at constant battle with its
own presence; its procedures and rules constantly affirm the present facts of its existence as
family reunion, classroom, etc. In fact, discourses or textual practices contribute to the
production of and the challenges to conventions. Fish offers this reading as an alternative
to Derrida’s image as a de-centered master of “free play.” Fish argues instead that.
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[wjhile he is certainly not a believer in the determinate meaning in a way that wouldgive comfort to say, M.H. Abrams or Frederick Crews, he does believe that
communications between two or more persons regularly occur and occur with a
relative certainty that ensures the continuity of everyday life. Rather than a
subvertor of common sense, this Derrida is very much a philosopher of common
sense, that is, of the underlying assumptions and conventions within which the
shape ol common sense is specified and acquires powerful force. (1989: 57)
The powerful force with which common sense is taken for granted is what a deconstructive
method attempts to locate. Fish later writes that force rests within the interpretation of law
because it is the interpretation that is rendered external to human experience.
The interpretation of law has traditionally relied upon a singular meaning emerging
from a common sensical reading-that is, legal interpretation comes “from an impersonal
source that resists the encroaching desire of particular (interpretive) wills” (Fish, 1989:
505). Fish argues that Hart’s distinction between penumbra and core cases relies upon a
contextualized interpretive community that has constructed certain cases as penumbra and
others as core. Core cases, of course, do exist--Fish writes--but their core-ness is a
function of the interpretive community in which they exist. To put it more simply, what
makes some cases “core” is not a transcendent or empirical truth of legal simplicity, but
rather is the result of an interpretive community steeped in doctrine, common law, history,
and precedent. Lawyers and judges did not discover that “A valid will must be signed by
two persons” when they ventured outside the cave. The rule that makes some cases simple
or core does not refer to the “form” of the simple case. Rather, in Derridean terms, the
simple case refers back only to itself and to the interpretive community that renders it.
Even (maybe especially) these simple cases risk the possibility of being mis-read or un-
read. Every case, interpretation, reading, speech act must be “‘read’ into being” (Fish,
1989: 47) and because language carries with it “the quality of risk,” the interpretation can
never be absolutely justified. The reader never receives exactly the message “intended” by
the writer. The speaker never conveys exactly the message he wants his listener to receive.
Every time a simple case is named as such, it has survived “a ‘mere temporary ascendancy’
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of one vision or agenda over its rivals” (Fish, 1989: 523). But, as the epigraph to this
chapter suggests, neither Derrida not Fish see this indeterminability as a slide into brutish
or paralyzing state of nature. Fish writes,
it appears to be disabling only if the alternative to neutrality is unprincipled force;
but if the alternative to neutrality is principled force—and it is my argument that there
is no other kind-then the unavailability of neutrality simply does not have and
could not have the consequences Hart fears. The absence of external and
independent constraints only means that the constraints inherent in the condition of
belief-the condition of having been persuaded to some vision-are always and
inescapably in force. (1989:522)
Rather than a sphere of open and free play. Fish, I think rightly, uses Derrida’s theory
about language to suggest that while we must constantly live with and rely upon our beliefs
with no hope for transcendental or objective truth, we must also just as constantly persuade
and be persuaded to alter or maintain the systems which guide our beliefs. These acts of
persuasion are politically—but not truth-fully—invested. Our inability to locate the origins
of our knowledge, rather than a signal for unmitigated play (which would, if you follow
Fish, be impossible anyway), is instead an argument about the force of persuasion and the
persuasive force of reading. That there is no textual center could be read as a fervent appeal
for contests over knowledge, theory, and common sense. Could this not also be a call to
politics?
Personal narratives have challenged jurisprudence to a kind of reading contest.
Personal narratives enter the context of jurisprudence-the interpretative terrain detailed in
the last chapter-and disrupt law’s discursive expectations. Further, personal narratives
represent a discursive choice (in genre, diction, tone, narrative reliability) that unites a
textual expression with a political mission. Personal legal narratives self-consciously
attempt to undermine what can be considered politically invested interpretive choices
inherent in legal discourse. Despite authors like Patricia Williams and Marie Ashe’s
attempts to thwart interpretations that place their work in either of the two critique-centered
camp (one based on identity, the other on legal reform), some in the legal academy
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continue to read personal narratives into the constraints of the two frameworks. If texts are
identity-based, their value is represented as their difference from traditional, dominant
voices. As such, they expose the politics of race and law, gender and law, etc. They are
political or critical texts which interrogate the meanings of legal doctrine and of legal
practices for raced and gendered people. If, on the other hand, these texts do call for a
change in the law, their writings are expected to be representative, typical, neutral, to work
inside the system. But, Williams’ texts propose neither a structural or scientized argument
for why the law has failed women and minorities, nor a universal solution to these
problems. Her personal narratives read both the interpretative constraints and her own
identity as un-centered-full of readers and texts producing meaning. Williams, therefore,
moves jurisprudence to a plain unconcerned with mythologizing law and equally
unconcerned with choosing between identity politics and legal neutrality.
D. Different Writing
. . .1 suppose I will never know my true fate. In the meantime, I read what text
there is of me.
Patricia Williams 17
Patricia Williams incorporates a reading of herself into a legal theory, into
alchemical notes, and into an exploration of prejudice. Morphing her middle class
upbringing and her “identities” as affirmative action baby, law professor, literary scholar,
African American woman, and single mother, Williams writes a disjointed and
cacophonous experience. In a 1987 law review article, Williams takes on the themes of
the Critical Legal Studies movement because of her “discomfort with that part of CLS
which rejects rights-based theory, particularly that part of the debate. . .which applies to the
black struggle for civil rights” (P. Williams, 1987: 404). It is within these criticisms of
i 7Williams, 1991: 233.
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leftist politics that Williams began to negotiate the genre that has come to be associated with
her. Through the writing of personal narrative, Williams explores and criticizes leftist
politics, but does not opt for what has been constructed as its only alternative
-the liberal
legal model. Williams criticizes critical legal studies’ suggestion that rights discourse be
abandoned since it exemplifies the liberal model and the insidiousness of domination and
hierarchy in law and society. While Williams understands rights to play a role in
maintaining the terms of power, she continues to respect law’s ability to produce grassroots
politics:
I by no means want to idealize the importance of rights in a legal system in which
rights are so often selectively invoked to draw boundaries, to isolate, and to limit.
At the same time, it is very hard to watch the idealistic or symbolic importance of
rights being diminished with reference to the disenfranchised, who experience and
express their disempowerment as nothing more or less than the denial of rights. (P.
Williams, 1987: 405)
Williams rejects the “either/of’ mandate of CLS and traditional legal scholarship by placing
her own scholarship in a space where “either/or” distinctions simply cease to make sense.
Thus, when Williams speaks of experience and identity formation and of how African
Americans hear the words individual and rights in a differently contextualized way, she is
theorizing a space between traditional and progressive jurisprudence.
By using the genre of personal legal narrative, Williams risks the use of the law and
of personal experience without succumbing to overly determined readings of both these
discourses. Williams writes, “[progressive] language of circumstantially-defined need-of
informality, of solidarity, of overcoming distance-sounded dangerously like the language
of oppression to someone like me who was looking through the establishment of identity,
the /orm-ation of an autonomous self’ (P. Williams, 1987: 409). That is, Williams
decision to place her scholarship in the realm of experience is a methodological and political
choice. It is a choice, however, that does not demand an empowered judge or government
to recognize or validate that experience. This is absolutely not to say that Williams is
79
disinterested in power. On the contrary, Williams genre has purposely located her text in
one of the spheres through which she believes power to work, i.e. the textual sphere.
Williams, like Patton, is concerned with how texts are seen to create and are then read off
as identity politics. As Patton suggested, representative politics and static identities do not
comprise the only--or even the most important-game in town. By addressing the
alchemists who labor away to locate themselves (momentarily) within competing and
disparate communities, Williams hopes to allow jurisprudence a hand at another game.
Subtitled “diary of a law professor,” Williams’ Alchemy of Race and Rights
incorporated this 1987 article and others into what could be read as a modem gesture
toward representation, toward representing her Self as an African American woman to the
predominantly white, male power of law. Instead and akin to Patton’s notion of identity,
Williams explores the performative characteristics of her own identity—those imposed by a
racist, sexist society and those adapted from the deconstruction of these racist, sexist
discourses:
I am trying to create a genre of legal scholarship to fill the gaps of traditional legal
scholarship. I would like to write in a way that reveals the intersubjectivity of legal
constructions, that forces the reader both to participate in the construction of
meaning and to be conscious of that process. Thus, . . .1 hope that the gaps in my
own writing will be self-consciously filled by the reader, as an act of forced
mirroring of meaning-invention. (1991: 7)
Williams’ text is itself an attempt to deconstruct legal style, contract law, polar' bears,
generic categorization, race, and gender. Her discursive and de-centered identity is
performed through her writing and through the readings of that writing by an audience both
inside and outside the legal world.
Williams supplements the ideas associated with traditional legal theory by
disclosing the politics of legal publishing. Williams is candid about how her writing about
her evolving perceptions is greeted by her peers and editors. When Williams offers for
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publication an account of her experience of being barred from Benetton, her editor
responds:
It s nice and poetic,’ but it doesn’t ‘advance the discussion of any principle.
.This is a law review, after all.” Frustrated, I accused him of censorship; calmly he
assured me it was not. This is just a matter of style,’ he said with firmness and
finality.’ (1991:48)
What makes Williams’ writing unique is not simply her decision to incorporate the “I”
pronoun into every aspect of her legal theorizing and critique; but her turning of the
spotlight on the very mechanisms of contemporary jurisprudence. The mundane and banal
aspects of law review publication decisions are advanced by Williams as an integral aspect
of the law. Comparing her incorporation of doctrine and statute with personal experience
and professional mechanisms to the work of Austin and Hart on judicial decision-making
and legal authority, Williams’ brand of legal theorizing is made all the more extraordinary.
Williams deconstructs the notion of “discretion” by exposing the mechanisms, prejudices,
and biases that function within the idea of discretion. Unlike Dworkin, Williams does not
wish to linguistically eradicate the very concept of discretion. Rather, Williams wants to
explore the ways discretion works within all facets of the legal profession-from academic
publishing to affirmative action. By placing herself both inside and outside the boundaries
of that discretionary space, Williams, too, offers a “double” (or multiple) consciousness
from which to analyze legal practices. Nevertheless, to locate moments of deconstruction
in Williams’ text is not to locate the politics of her text. How is Williams’ text as text
politics?
Again, the addition of Patton’s notion of postmodern govemmentality to Cornell’s
method of ethical deconstruction is crucial. Williams is aware that within her own writing,
the remains of the Other is always already “present.” Further, and like Fish, Williams
suggests that the reader will bring his or her own Self (with its remains of the Other) to the
reading of her text. This method of writing is meant to interact with multiple readings to
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produce a risky or contestable proposition. But, remember, the potential for deconstruction
exists whether we want it to or not As Cornell quotes Derrida:
As we have seen, the very condition of a deconstruction may be at work, in the
work, within the system to be deconstructed; it may already be located there,
already at work, not at the center but in an excentric center, in a comer whose
eccentricity assures solid concentration of the system, participating in the
construction of what it at the same time threatens to deconstruct. One might then be
inclined to reach this conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that supervenes
afterwards, from the outside, one fine day . .
.
(1992b: 81)
Unlike Fraser, Williams takes this “fact” not as a cause for paralysis, but as a cause for
production, for a new writing, for a new readerly/writerly relationship.
In The Rooster’s Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice (1995), Williams shifts the
focus of her writing to questions of intolerance and hate. In creating a personal narrative
about prejudice, Williams entwines the discourses of law, jurisprudence, and culture.
Law professors, judges, and lawyers are as often cited as media personalities, politicians,
and televangelists. Each is called upon in an attempt to answer the question: How are we
to talk about prejudice without either condoning it as natural or inevitable or masking it
with enlightenment theories? The important words to remember in this question are, “how
are we to talk...” because, for Williams, how we talk about ideas is pivotal in determining
what, how, and whether we do anything about them. Again, Williams’ Rooster's Egg
does not develop a key to ending prejudice. It does not re-write the a kinder, gentler myth
of justice and equality. Rather, Williams argues that prejudice is written into seemingly
neutral discourses. First ladies, single motherhood, theater are each being written and read
through the lens of a powerful race and gender mythology. Williams writes:
If eliminating the stigma were truly as simple as erasing labels, then perhaps
enough White-Out in our cases and codes would eliminate the problem once and for
all. But it is the ferocious mythology of blackness (or otherness) as the
embodiment of inferiority that persists whether blacks are inside or outside
particular institutions and regardless of how they perform. (1995: 105)
Williams is again arguing that the mythology of embodied inequality, not just racist or
sexist codes and statutes within a representative government, writes prejudice onto the
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bodies and minds of its subjects. If she is to take the mythically charged prejudice
seriously, then, it is necessary for Williams to write in a way that does not weave its way
back into traditional, representational politics. Neither does Williams wish to create an
alternative mythology through which a different embodiment of natural and true meaning is
endowed-though such a writing endeavor, Williams admits, is tempting:
While I am not a great fan of idealization of any sort, I have begun to long for just a
touch of counter-mythology. Say, the mythic black single mother educates her
young’ uns against all the odds, wrassles urban coyotes, and all the while stretching
that two-dollar welfare check over twenty-one meals ‘til Sunday. (1995: 176)
Counter-mythology, however, is not viable. Instead and without begrudging the politics of
representation their many hard-fought achievements, Williams offers readings of prejudice
that place her (multiple) selves-rather than any mythic truth claim-in a tenuous and
interpretable discourse.
The tenuous character of Williams’ perspective is apparent when comparing
Alchemy to The Rooster’s Egg. This is a slightly different Williams. The tone of this text
shifts to that of an increasingly alienated observer. Williams often chastises her own
misreadings of the cultural landscape: “But as usual, I was wrong. And not just a little
wrong, but a whole lot” (1995: 154). Like a writer of fiction producing an unreliable
narrator, Williams ironically combines both reminders of her misreadings with forthright
admonitions of the right thing to do. We must acknowledge the fruits of affirmative
action’s labor; we must not demonize women who are educated and outspoken; we must
not quiedy acquiesce to the Jewish Princess joke here and the poor white trash joke there if
we expect the discourse of prejudice to disappear. By combining these contesting images
of herself, Williams invites the reader to make his or her own “truth” from Williams’
“facts.” Nothing in Williams’ narrative should be taken at face value-interpretation has
produced this narrative just as an interpretive community will produce readings of this
narrative. In this sense, personal narratives as political theory become ironic in the most
83
obvious sense. Williams has based this genre of so-called “identity politics” upon the
rejection of an identical relationship between who the theorist is and what she writes and
what readers read. Williams calls for a distinction between identity and interpretation. For
example, Williams writes:
The substitution of role models for complete understanding of the political
implications of certain philosophical doctrines results in the privatization of the
political, and shifts focus from the implications of philosophy to the personalities of
its proponents. It also makes these proponents very authoritative. It cedes to them
enormous and total power over the consequences of “their” theories, as if theory
has no life beyond birth, no interpretive, generative property as taken up and
reiterated by others. . .(1995: 128)
One might suspect that Fish would regard the reading of theory as an extension of identity
as itself the product of an interpretive community—a community steeped in the cult of
personality. Williams’ irony lies in her attempt to shift interpretation away from personality
with a text of and perfectly suited for this interpretive community. Through Williams
reading of her own experience, she deconstructs identity and the “myth” that experience is
the one valid truth claim left in this (post)modem world. As an admittedly unreliable reader
of her own and others’ experience, Williams deconstructs the genre itself and produces a
different level of discourse where there can be no valid truth claims, no singular
personality.
E. Conclusion
When Kirstie McClure argues that thinking about theory as an active, political
endeavor might be “less content upon adjudicating or settling practices and more concerned
with mobilizing meanings” (1992: 365), she could have a text like Williams' in mind. If
such texts are to be viewed as political acts, however, an understanding of active political
behavior as only the politics of representation or as appeals to authority or to the state must
necessarily be expanded-not abandoned, but expanded. The politics of postmodern
governmentality occur in the fast and floating contests over whose and how texts are read.
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how texts are written, and whose bodies are being “read off.” These battles do not
necessarily shape legislation (although they might), do not necessarily become socially
entrenched (although some have), and do not necessarily enter the halls of academia or law
(although a few have). Rather, within these battles, words produce shifts and interruptions




From time to time I try to imagine this world of which he spoke—a culture in whose
mythology words might be that precious, in which words were conceived as
vessels for communications from the heart; a society in which words are holy, and
the challenge of life is based upon a quest for gentle words, holy words, gentle
truths, holy truths. I try to imagine for myself a world in which the words one
gives one’s children are the shell into which they shall grow, so one chooses one’s




In Williams’ wishful thinking, there is, of course, a hint of reality-a reality that her own
writing has helped to create and comprehend. The key to this reality, however, is that
words carry no mythical endowment, no prerogative toward magnificent inheritances,
gentle truths, or holy quests. Words are— intentions always aside—one of the modes
through which power asserts itself in numerous and unaccountable ways. The text
becomes the location of this political relationship between reader and writer, text and
interpretation. By placing herself in the center of her text, Williams’ genre challenges the
overly-determined “perspectiv-ism” of both identity politics and liberal ideology to an
utterly in-determinate space. Within her text and within its community of readers, this
contest takes place as interpretations and readings contest the value and the meaning




Rape exists because our experience and deployment of our bodies is the effect of
interpretations, representations, and fantasies which often position us in ways
amenable to the realization of the rape script: as paralyzed, as incapable of physical
violence, as fearful. New cultural productions and reinscriptions of our bodies and
our geographies can help us begin to revise the grammar of violence and to
represent ourselves in militant new ways.
Sharon Marcus 18
Sharon Marcus reminds us again of the mutually re-enforcing relationship between
texts and what we call real life or experience. Just as Marcus sees the politics of a scripted
narrative in the real definitions of rape, I would argue that a politics of interpretation,
experience, and reading exists in the space of abstract theoretical narratives. Neither
position recognizes representative or institutional politics as the only battles and contests
around. Applying Patton’s understanding of postmodern identity as not what it once was,
I would argue that texts (to those who write within this “intersubjective” manner) are not
what they once were. Texts are one possible engagement in Patton’s “crisis of duty”
(1993: 172). Self-consciously “deconstructive writing” is engaged in politics, in a contest
over which (whose) styles and readings should “produce the categories of govemmentality
that engender the administrative state apparatus” (1993: 173). Bodies, identities,
meanings, and “truths” are the currency in both modem and postmodern govemmentality,
but how this currency is exchanged has changed. Personal legal narratives and the
temptations from which they emerge stand as one possible example of this conflation of
narrative or text and experience or politics. By reading texts like Williams the way this




With a new style of writing, Williams textualizes this battle between traditional legal
thought, critical legal studies, contract law, student and teacher, and Williams own style.
Within the infinite readings and temptations of the text, these factions clash and jostle for
position (no matter how temporary that position might be). Does this lead to politics being
everywhere and, thus, nowhere? Hardly. With an ethical conception of deconstruction or
“the philosophy of the limit,” blank signifiers become political choices. Limits multiply
meanings rather than hide ideologies. Thus, generic choices become ethical constraints.
Texts “play” the game of politics by disrupting and irrevocably altering discourses through
writing and reading practices. Postmodern govemmentality adds to deconstruction the self-
consciousness of a political will. Textual politics confer agency upon both writings and
readings, writer and reader. From these multiple possibilities for readings, contests over
what texts say and whose meaning will matter take on the properties of a real, dirty political
battle. With politics defined as the struggle to authorize discourses, political theory will
produce neither blueprints nor maps, but rather, will stake out what McClure calls
“breathing room for the articulation of new knowledges, new agencies, and new practices”
(1992: 365). This thesis has argued that personal legal narratives exemplify the battles over
textual authority being waged in the writings and readings of law every day. Narratives
like Patricia Williams’ and theories like deconstruction have shifted the questions implicit in
these battles from, “Whose experience is real and true?” to “Whose reading or writing of
‘experience’ counts right now?” With this shift, jurisprudence is asked neither to justify its
own existence nor to find the ultimate reform. Instead, jurisprudence might articulate how
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